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Abstract
In this paper, we extend the Holmström and Milgrom problem [47] by adding uncertainty about the
volatility of the output for both the Agent and the Principal. We study more precisely the impact of the
"Nature" playing against the Agent and the Principal by choosing the worst possible volatility of the output.
We solve the first–best and the second-best problems associated with this framework and we show that
optimal contracts are in a class of contracts similar to [14, 15], linear with respect to the output and its
quadratic variation. We compare our results with the classical problem in [47].
Key words: Risk–sharing, moral hazard, Principal–Agent, second–order BSDEs, volatility uncertainty,
Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs PDEs.
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1 Introduction
By and large, it has now become common knowledge among the economists, that almost everything in economics
was to a certain degree a matter of incentives: incentives to work hard, to produce, to study, to invest, to
consume reasonably... At the heart of the importance of incentives, lies the fact that, to quote B. Salanié
[79] "asymmetries of information are pervasive in economic relationships, that is to say, customers know more
about their tastes than firms, firms know more about their costs than the government, and all Agents take
actions that are at least partly unobservable”. Starting from the 70s, the theory of contracts evolved from this
acknowledgment and the fact that such situations could not be reproduced using the general equilibrium theory.
In the corresponding typical situation, a Principal (who takes the initiative of the contract) is (potentially)
imperfectly informed about the actions of an Agent (who accepts or rejects the contract). The goal is to design
a contract that maximises the utility of the Principal while that of the Agent is held to a given level. Of course,
the form of the optimal contracts typically depends on whether these actions are observable/contractible or not,
and on whether there are characteristics of the Agent that are unknown to the Principal. There are three main
types of such problems: the first best case, or risk sharing, in which both parties have the same information;
the second best case, or moral hazard, in which the action of the Agent is hidden or not contractible; the third
best case or adverse selection, in which the type of the Agent is hidden. We will not study this last problem,
and refer the interested reader to, among others, [13, 16, 19, 80, 93]. These problems are fundamentally linked
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to designing optimal incentives, and are therefore present in a very large number of situations. Beyond the
obvious application to the optimal remuneration of an employee, one can for instance think on how regulators
with imperfect information and limited policy instruments can motivate banks to operate entirely in the social
interest, on how a company can optimally compensate its executives, on how banks achieve optimal securitisation
of mortgage loans or on how investors should pay their portfolio managers (see Bolton and Dewatripont [6] or
Laffont and Martimort [49] for many more examples).
Early studies of the risk-sharing problem can be found, among others, in Borch [7], Wilson [99] or Ross [78].
Since then, a large literature has emerged, solving very general risk-sharing problems, for instance in a framework
with several Agents and recursive utilities (see Duffie et al. [25] or Dumas et al. [26], or for studying optimal
compensation of portfolio managers (see Ou-Yang [60] or Cadenillas et al. [11]). From the mathematical point
of view, these problems can usually be tackled using either their dual formulation or the so–called stochastic
maximum principle, which can characterize the optimal choices of the Principal and the Agent through coupled
systems of Forward Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (FBSDEs in the sequel) (see the very nice
monograph [20] by Cvitanić and Zhang for a systematic presentation). One of the main findings in almost
all of these works, is that one can find an optimal contract which is linear in the terminal value of the output
managed by the Agent (a result already obtained in [78]) and possibly some benchmark to which his performance
is compared. In specific cases, one can even have Markovian optimal contracts which are given as a (possibly
linear) functional of the terminal value of the output (see in particular [11] for details).
Concerning the so–called moral hazard problem, the first paper on continuous-time Principal–Agent problems is
the seminal paper by Holmström and Milgrom [47]. They consider a Principal and an Agent with exponential
utility functions and find that the optimal contract is linear. Their work was generalized by Schättler and
Sung [83, 84], Sung [90, 91], Müller [54, 55], and Hellwig and Schmidt [46], using a dynamic programming and
martingales approach, which is classical in stochastic control theory (see also the survey paper by Sung [92]
for more references). The papers by Williams [97] and Cvitanić, Wan and Zhang [17, 18] use the stochastic
maximum principle and FBSDEs to characterise the optimal compensation for more general utility functions.
More recently, Djehiche and Hegelsson [23, 24] have also used this approach. A more recent seminal paper in
moral hazard setting is Sannikov [81], who finds a tractable model for solving the problem with a random time
of retiring the Agent and with continuous payments, rather than a lump-sum payment at the terminal time.
Since then, a growing literature extending the above models has emerged, be it to include output processes with
jumps [5, 12, 62, 63, 101], imperfect information and learning [1, 21, 39, 40, 44, 71], asset pricing [61], executive
compensation [43], or mortgage contracts [67] (see also the illuminating survey paper [82] for more references).
Compared to the first–best problem, the moral hazard case corresponds to a Stackelberg–like game between the
Principal and the Agent, in the sense that the Principal will start by trying to compute the reaction function
of the Agent to a given contract (that is to say the optimal action chosen by the Agent given the contract),
and use this action to maximise his utility over all admissible contracts1. This approach does not always work,
because it may be hard to solve the Agent’s stochastic control problem given an arbitrary payoff, possibly
non-Markovian, and it may also be hard for the Principal to maximise over all such contracts. Furthermore, the
Agent’s optimal control, if it even exists, depends on the given contract in a highly non–linear manner, rendering
the Principal’s optimisation problem even harder and obscure. For these reasons, and as mentioned above, in its
most general form the problem was also approached in the literature by the stochastic version of the Pontryagin
maximal principle. Nonetheless, none of these standard approaches can solve the problem when the Agent also
controls the diffusion coefficient of the output, and not just the drift. Building upon this gap in the literature,
Cvitanić, Possamaï and Touzi [14, 15] have very recently developed a general approach of the problem through
1For a recent different approach, see Miller and Yang [53]. For each possible Agent’s control process, they characterise contracts
that are incentive compatible for it.
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dynamic programming and so-called BSDEs and 2BSDEs, showing that under mild conditions, the problem of
the Principal could always be rewritten in an equivalent way as a standard stochastic control problem involving
two state variables, namely the output itself but also the continuation utility (or value function) of the Agent, a
property which was pointed out by Sannikov in the specific setting of [81], and which was already well–known by
the economists, even in discrete–time models, see for instance Spear and Srivastrava [88]. An important finding
of [14], in the context of a delegated portfolio management problem which generalizes Holmström and Milgrom
problem [47] to a context where the Agent can control the volatility of the (multidimensional) output process,
is that in both the first–best and moral hazard problems, the optimal contracts become path–dependent, as
they crucially use the quadratic variation of the output process (see also [50] for a related problem).
Our goal in this paper is to study yet another generalisation of the Holmström and Milgrom problem [47], to
a setting where the Agent only controls the drift of the output, but where the twist is that both the Principal
and the Agent may have some uncertainty about the volatility of the output, and only believe that it lies in
some given interval of R+. This is the so–called situation of volatility ambiguity which has received a lot of
attention recently, both in the mathematical finance community, since the seminal paper by Denis and Martini
[22], and in the economics literature, see for instance [34, 35]. From the mathematical point of view, everything
happens as if both the Principal and the Agent have a "worst–case" approach to the contracting problem, in
the sense that they act as if "Nature" was playing against them by choosing the worst possible volatility of the
output. Mathematically, this means that the Principal and the Agent utility criterion incorporates the fact that
they are playing a zero–sum game against "Nature". Furthermore, we put no restrictions on the beliefs that
the Agent and the Principal have with respect to the likely volatility scenario, in the sense that their volatility
intervals may or may not have non–empty intersections
Although the impact of volatility ambiguity on optimal contracting has not been considered before in the
literature2, the impact of drift ambiguity has been studied by Weinschenk [96] for linear contracts in discrete–
time, by Szydlowski [95] and Miao and Rivera [52] who consider an extension of Sannikov’s model [81] including
ambiguity about the Agent’s effort cost. Our paper also belongs to the literature on optimal contracting with
learning, for which we can refer to the seminal papers of Williams [98], Prat and Jovanovic [71] and He, Wei
and Yu [45], or to Golosov, Troshkin and Tsyvinski [41] and Farhi and Werning [36] for models addressing
learning in the context of optimal dynamic taxation, Pavan, Segal and Toikka [64] and Garrett and Pavan [38]
for models with transferrable utility, or DeMarzo and Sannikov [21] for a setting in which both the Principal
and the Agent learn about future profitability from output. The learning feature of our model however concerns
the risk–aversion of the Principal and the Agent themselves.
Our fist task in this paper is to solve the risk–sharing problem. Surprisingly, this problem is much more
involved than in the classical case, since it takes a very unusual form, as a supremum of a sum of two infimum
over different sets. Nonetheless, we provide a generic method to solve it, which first focus on a sub–class of
contracts similar to the ones obtained in [14, 15], and then uses calculus of variations and convex analysis to
argue that the optimal contracts in the sub–class should be optimal in the class of all admissible contracts.
We use it successfully in what we coin a "non–learning" model, where both the Principal and the Agent do
not update their beliefs with regards to volatility as time passes. Despite being restrictive, this benchmark
model has the nice property that everything becomes completely explicit, and illustrates how our method can
be applied in practice. We also highlight a surprising effect, which we interpret as a kind of arbitrage–like
situation3, corresponding to the situation where the volatility intervals of the Principal and the Agent are
2After the completion of this paper, we have been made aware of a paper in preparation by Sung, where the author studies a
problem similar to ours. Since a preprint version of this paper [94] has appeared during the revision of the present manuscript, we
will explain and detail the main differences between the two of them in Section 5 below.
3We would like to thank one of the referees for suggesting this interpretation.
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completely disjoint. In this case the problem degenerates and the Principal can actually reach utility 0 using an
appropriate sequence of contracts (we remind the reader that the exponential utility is − exp(−Rpx), so that
it is bounded from above by 0).
Next, we concentrate on the second–best problem. Our first contribution is to use the theory of second–order
BSDEs developed by Soner, Touzi and Zhang [87], and more precisely the recent wellposedness results obtained
by Possamaï, Tan and Zhou [69], to obtain a probabilistic representation of the value function of the Agent,
for any sufficiently integrable contract. In particular, this representation gives an easy access to the optimal
action chosen by the Agent. Then, following the ideas of [14, 15], we concentrate our attention on a sub–class of
contracts, for which the Principal problem can be solved using classical dynamic programming type arguments.
The main problem is then to prove that the restriction is actually without loss of generality. We emphasise that
in spite of the fact that this approach is similar in spirit to the one used in [15], we cannot use their method of
proof. Indeed, our problem is of a fundamentally different nature, because the Agent himself does not control
the volatility of the output, but rather endures it. We therefore have to proceed completely differently and
provide a general argument which shows with PDE technics, that the value function of the original and the
sub–optimal problem actually solve the same PDE, which implies that they are equal by uniqueness of the
solution to this PDE. We believe that this general approach can actually be applied to many situations and,
constitutes one of our main contributions. In addition, we obtain an extremely general result stating that if the
beliefs of the Principal and the Agent are completely different, then the problem always degenerates, and the
Principal can reach utility 0, making the second–best and first–best problems identical. Once more, this result
highlights the necessity to get rid of these arbitrage-like situations.
For simplicity and clarity, we also solve by a direct method the problem in the "non–learning" model mentioned
above, where the identification of the two value functions can actually be obtained by simple (but tedious)
algebra, constructing appropriate tight upper and lower bounds?
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We introduce the model and the contracting problem in Section
2. Then Section 3 is devoted to the risk–sharing problem, while Section 4 treats the moral hazard case. We
finally present some possible extensions in Section 5. The Appendix regroups some technical proofs.
2 The model
2.1 The stochastic basis
We start by giving all the necessary notations and definitions allowing us to consider the so–called "weak"
formulation of the problem.
In this paper, we will denote by R∗+ the set of positive reals. Let Ω := {ω ∈ C ([0, T ] ,R) , ω0 = 0} be the
canonical space equipped with the uniform norm ||ω||T∞ := sup0≤t≤T |ωt|. We then denote by B the canonical
process, P0 the Wiener measure, F := {Ft}0≤t≤T the filtration generated by B and F
+ := {F+t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T}, the
right limit of F where F+t := ∩s>tFs. We will denote by M(Ω) the set of all probability measures on (Ω,FT ).
We also recall the so–called universal filtration F⋆ := {F⋆t }0≤t≤T defined as follows
F⋆t :=
⋂
P∈M(Ω)
FPt ,
where FPt is the usual augmentation under P.
For any normed vector space (E, ‖·‖E) of a finite dimensional space and any filtration X on (Ω,FT ), we denote by
H0(E,X) the set of all X−progressively measurable processes with values in E. Moreover for all p > 0 and for all
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P ∈M(Ω), we denote by Hp(P, E,X) the subset of H0(E,X) whose elements H satisfy EP
[∫ T
0 ‖Ht‖
p
E dt
]
< +∞.
The localised versions of these spaces are denoted by Hp
loc
(P, E,X).
For any subset P ⊂M(Ω), a P−polar set is a P−negligible set for all P ∈ P, and we say that a property holds
P−quasi–surely if it holds outside some P−polar set. We also denote by HpP(E,X) :=
⋂
P∈P H
p
loc
(P, E,X).
Finally, we introduce the following filtration GP := {GPt }0≤t≤T which will be useful in the sequel
GPt := F
⋆
t ∨ N
P , t ≤ T,
where NP is the collection of P−polar sets, and its right–continuous limit, denoted GP,+.
Let us use the notation R⋆+ := (0,+∞). For all α ∈ H
1
loc
(P0,R
⋆
+,F), we define the following probability measure
on (Ω,F)
Pα := P0 ◦ (X
α
. )
−1 where Xαt :=
∫ t
0
α1/2s dBs, t ∈ [0, T ], P0 − a.s. (2.1)
We denote by PS the collection of all such probability measures on (Ω,FT ). We recall from [48] that the
quadratic variation process 〈B〉 is universally defined under any P ∈ PS , and takes values in the set of all
non–decreasing continuous functions from R+ to R
⋆
+. We denote for any p > 0
Ĥ
p
P(E,X) :=
{
γ ∈ H0(E,X), sup
P∈P
EP
[∫ T
0
‖γt‖
p
E d〈B〉t
]
< +∞
}
.
We will denote the path–wise density of 〈B〉 with respect to the Lebesgue measure by α̂. Finally we recall from
[86] that every P ∈ PS satisfies the Blumenthal zero–one law and the martingale representation property. By
definition, for any P ∈ PS
W Pt :=
∫ t
0
α̂−1/2s dBs, P− a.s.,
is a (P,F)−Brownian motion. Notice that the probability measures in P ∈ PS verify that the two following
completed filtrations are equal
FP = (FW
P
)P, (2.2)
where FW
P
is the natural (raw) filtration of the process W P.
The dependence of W P on the underlying probability measure is mainly due to the fact that the construction
of the stochastic integral is generically done only in an almost sure sense. For want of cosmetically nicer
results, we would like to be able to find a universal aggregator of this family. Using the result of [57], and for
instance assuming that we work under the usual ZFC framework, and in addition the continuum hypothesis4,
there actually exists an aggregated version of this family, which we denote by W , which is F⋆−adapted and a
(P,FP)−Brownian motion for every P ∈ PS .
Our focus in this paper will be on the following subset of PS .
Definition 2.1. Pm is the sub–class of PS consisting of all P ∈ PS such that the canonical process B is a
(P,F)−uniformly integrable martingale.
4We insist on the fact that if one does not want to assume such an axiom, this is not a problem for this part of our work,
and one just has to keep working with the family (W P)P∈PS . However, when defining the set of admissible contracts C
SB later
in the paper, we will need it in order to define aggregated versions of stochastic integrals. If one does not want to use it then, it
means that we have to restrict the control processes Z in CSB to ones having sufficiently regular trajectories to apply the pathwise
integration theory of Karandikar [48] for instance. By standard density results, it should however not change the value function of
the Principal.
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The actions of the Agent will be considered as F−predictable processes a taking values in the compact set
[0, amax] (for every ω). This upper bound corresponds to a maximal effort for the Agent, and we assume that
it is known by the Principal. We believe that such an assumption is reasonable, since we assume here that
the Principal knows the key characteristics of the Agent, and that the latter cannot exercise arbitrarily large
effort5. We denote this set by A. Next, for any subset P ⊂ PS and any a ∈ A, we define
Pa :=
{
Q, s.t.
dQ
dP
= E
(∫ T
0
asα̂
−1/2
s dWs
)
, P− a.s., for some P ∈ P
}
.
We also denote PA := ∪a∈AP
a. In particular, for every P ∈ PA there exists a unique pair (αP, aP) ∈
H1
loc
(P0,R
⋆
+,F)×A such that
Bt =
∫ t
0
aPsds+
∫ t
0
(αPs )
1/2dW a
P
s , P− a.s., (2.3)
where dW a
P
s := dWs − (α
P
s )
−1/2aPsds, P − a.s. is a (P
a,FP
a
)−Brownian motion by Girsanov’s theorem. More
precisely, for any P ∈ PA, we must have
dP
dPα
= E
(∫ T
0
asα̂
−1/2
s dBs
)
,
for some (α, a) ∈ H1
loc
(P0,R
⋆
+,F)×A and the following equalities hold
aP(B·) = a(B·) and α
P(B·) = α(W·), dt× P− a.e.
For simplicity, we will therefore sometimes denote a probability measure P ∈ PAS by P
α
a . For any subset of
P ⊂ Pm, we also denote for any (t,P) ∈ [0, T ]× P
P(P, t+) :=
{
P
′
∈ P, P
′
= P, on F+t
}
.
We also recall that for every probability measure P on Ω and F−stopping time τ taking value in [0, T ], there
exists a family of regular conditional probability distribution (r.c.p.d. for short) (Pτω)ω∈Ω (see e.g. Stroock and
Varadhan [89]), satisfying
(i) For every ω ∈ Ω, Pτω is a probability measure on (Ω,FT ).
(ii) For every E ∈ FT , the mapping ω 7−→ P
τ
ω(E) is Fτ−measurable.
(iii) The family (Pτω)ω∈Ω is a version of the conditional probability measure of P on Fτ , i.e., for every integrable
FT−measurable random variable ξ we have E
P[ξ|Fτ ](ω) = E
Pτω
[
ξ
]
, for P− a.e. ω ∈ Ω.
(iv) For every ω ∈ Ω, Pτω(Ω
ω
τ ) = 1, where Ω
ω
τ :=
{
ω ∈ Ω, ω(s) = ω(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ τ(ω)
}
.
Furthermore, given some P and a family (Qω)ω∈Ω such that ω 7−→ Qω is Fτ−measurable and Qω(Ω
ω
τ ) = 1 for
all ω ∈ Ω, one can then define a concatenated probability measure P⊗τ Q· by
P⊗τ Q·
[
A
]
:=
∫
Ω
Qω
[
A
]
P(dω), ∀A ∈ FT .
We conclude this introductory section by noticing that since any a ∈ A impacts only the drift in the decompo-
sition (2.3) of B, we directly have that for any P1,P2 subsets of Pm
∃ a ∈ A, P1 ∩ P2 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ ∀ a ∈ A, P
a
1 ∩ P
a
2 6= ∅. (2.4)
5Obviously, an extension of the present framework to model incorporating adverse selection, that is to say that the Principal
does not actually know perfectly all the characteristics of the Agent, is not only interesting mathematically, but also from the point
of view of applications. However, we believe that this would lead to a much more difficult problem and leave it for future research.
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2.2 The contracting problem in finite horizon
2.2.1 The ambiguity sets
We consider a generalisation of the classical problem of Holmström and Milgrom [47] and fix a given time
horizon T > 0. Here the Agent and the Principal both observe the outcome process B, but the Principal may
not observe the action chosen by the Agent6, and both of them have a "worst–case" approach to the contract,
in the sense that they act as if "Nature" was playing against them by choosing the worst possible volatility of
the output. More precisely, a contract will be a FT−measurable random variable, corresponding to the salary
received by the Agent at time T only. The Agent has then some beliefs about the volatility of the project,
which are summed up in a family (PA(t, ω))(t,ω)∈[0,T ]×Ω, such that for any (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω, PA(t, ω) ⊂ Pm.
The dependence in (t, ω) allows the beliefs of the Agent with regards to the volatility to change with both time
and the observed randomness, that is to say with the evolution and history of the output process B. Similarly,
we introduce a family (PP (t, ω))(t,ω)∈[0,T ]×Ω associated to the Principal’s beliefs. Notice that since ω0 = 0 for
any ω ∈ Ω, these sets at t = 0 do not depend on Ω, so that we will use the simplified notations PA := PA(0, ω)
and PP := PP (0, ω), for any ω ∈ Ω. We emphasise that these families cannot be chosen completely arbitrarily,
and have to satisfy a certain number of stability and measurability properties, which are classical in stochastic
control theory. Most of these are quite technical, so that we will refrain from commenting them, and refer
instead the interested reader to [69] for instance. We will hence assume throughout the paper the following
Assumption 2.1. For Ψ = A,P , we have
(i) For every (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω, one has PΨ(t, ω) = PΨ(t, ω·∧t) and P(Ω
ω
t ) = 1 whenever P ∈ PΨ(t, ω). The
graph [[PΨ]] of PΨ, defined by [[PΨ]] := {(t, ω,P) : P ∈ PΨ(t, ω)}, is upper semi–analytic in [0, T ]×Ω×M(Ω).
(ii) PΨ is stable under conditioning, i.e. for every (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω and every P ∈ PΨ(t, ω) together with
an F−stopping time τ taking values in [t, T ], there is a family of r.c.p.d. (Pw)w∈Ω such that Pw ∈ PΨ(τ(w),w),
for P− a.e. w ∈ Ω.
(iii) PΨ is stable under concatenation, i.e. for every (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω and P ∈ PΨ(t, ω) together
with a F−stopping time τ taking values in [t, T ], if (Qw)w∈Ω is a family of probability measures such that
Qw ∈ PΨ(τ(w),w) for all w ∈ Ω and w 7−→ Qw is Fτ−measurable, then the concatenated probability measure
P⊗τ Q· ∈ PΨ(t, ω).
We will also need to consider the support of α̂ induced by these families.
Definition 2.2. For Ψ = A,P , we denote, for any (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω, by DΨ(t, ω) the smallest closed subset of
R⋆+ such that
P ({w ∈ Ω, α̂s(w) ∈ DΨ(t+ s, ω ⊗t w), for a.e. s ∈ [0, T − t]}) = 1,
where the concatenated path ω ⊗t w ∈ Ω is defined by
(ω ⊗t w)(s) := ω(s)1s≤t + (w(s)− ω(t))1s∈(t,T ], s ∈ [0, T ].
Let us conclude this section with our motivating examples of ambiguity sets.
Example 2.1 (Learning and non–learning models). The main example we have in mind here is the one
corresponding to the so–called random G−expectations, introduced by Nutz in [58]. The idea is to specify
directly the support of α̂ and to consider, for Ψ = A,P , set–valued processes DΨ : [0, T ] × Ω 7−→ 2
R⋆+ which
are progressively measurable in the sense of graph–measurability, that is to say that for all t ∈ [0, T ], we have{
(s, ω,A) ∈ [0, t]× Ω× R⋆+, A ∈ DΨ(s, ω)
}
∈ B([0, t]) ⊗Ft ⊗ B(R
⋆
+),
6He observes it in the risk–sharing problem of Section 3, but not in the moral hazard case of Section 4.
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where B([0, t]) and B(R⋆+) are the Borel σ−algebrae of [0, t] and R
⋆
+. In this case, the sets PΨ(t, ω) are defined
for any (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω as being the collection of probability measures P ∈M(Ω) such that
α̂s(w) ∈ DΨ(s+ t, ω ⊗t w), for ds⊗ dP− a.e. (s,w) ∈ [0, T − t]× Ω.
It has been shown by Nutz and van Handel in [59] that the sets PΨ(t, ω) indeed satisfy Assumption 2.1.
We can for instance assume that there exist processes (αP , αA, αP , αA) ∈
(
H0(R∗+,F)
)4
such that for any
(t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω
DA(t, ω) = [α
A
t (ω), α
A
t (ω)], DP (t, ω) = [α
P
t (ω), α
P
t (ω)].
This typically leads to a model in which the Principal and the Agent estimate that the volatility of the output
will live in intervals, whose bounds may vary with respect to the path of the output process. An interpretation of
this specification is that both the Principal and the Agent update their beliefs by observing the past realisations
of the output process B, and therefore that there is some kind of learning effect.
In this paper, we will explain how to solve in general the moral hazard problems associated to such frame-
works, by relating it to some Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs partial differential equation. However, we will
illustrate further our results in the only case which, to the best of our knowledge, leads to completely explicit
computations, corresponding to assuming that αP , αA, αP , αA are constant processes. In this case, the Agent
and the Principal are not learning with time. Obviously, this is an unrealistic situation, and will lead in some
cases to arbitrage–like results, that will be commented upon. Nonetheless, we believe that with appropriate
caution, even this case leads to interesting qualitative results, and deserves to be treated thoroughly.
2.2.2 Utilities of the Principal and the Agent
We have now all the necessary tools to specify the utility obtained by the Agent, given a contract ξ, a recom-
mended level of effort a ∈ A and an ambiguity set (PA(t, ω))(t,ω)∈[0,T ]×Ω
uA0 (ξ, a) := inf
P∈PaA
EP
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]
,
where UA(x) := − exp (−RAx) is the utility function of the Agent, for some RA > 0, and k(x) is his cost
function, which, as usual is assumed to be increasing, strictly convex and super–linear.
The value function of the Agent at time 0 is therefore
UA0 (ξ) := sup
a∈A
inf
P∈PaA
EP
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]
.
Similarly, the utility of the Principal, having an ambiguity set (PP (t, ω))(t,ω)∈[0,T ]×Ω, when offering a contract
ξ and a recommended level of effort a ∈ A is
uP0 (ξ, a) := inf
P∈PaP
EP [UP (BT − ξ)] , (2.5)
where UP (x) := − exp (−RPx) is the utility function of the Principal.
Let R < 0 denote the reservation utility of the Agent. The problem of the Principal is then to offer a contract
ξ as well as a recommended level of effort a so as to maximize his utility (2.5), subject to the constraints
uA0 (ξ, a) ≥ R, (2.6)
uA0 (ξ, a) = U
A
0 (ξ). (2.7)
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The first constraint is the so–called participation constraint, while the second one is the usual incentive com-
patibility condition, stating that the recommended level of effort a should be the optimal response of the Agent,
given the contract ξ.
Furthermore, we will denote by C the set of admissible contracts, that is to say the set of FT−measurable
random variables such that
sup
P∈PAA∪P
A
P
EP [exp (p |ξ|)] < +∞, for any p ≥ 0, (2.8)
and we emphasise immediately that we will have to restrict a bit more the admissible contracts when solving
the second–best problem, for technical reasons linked to integrability assumptions. However, we postpone the
exact statement to Section 4.3, since it requires quite an important number of preliminaries.
3 The first–best: a problem of calculus of variations
In this section, we start by studying the first–best problem for the Principal, since it will serve as our main
benchmark and has not been considered, as far as we know, in the pre–existing literature7. Moreover, we will see
that the derivation is a lot more complicated than in the classical setting. So much so that, quite surprisingly
compared with the classical Holmström and Milgrom [47] problem, the optimal contracts are in general not
linear with respect to the final value of the output BT , and are even path–dependent.
Recall that for any contract ξ ∈ C and for any recommended effort level a ∈ A
uP0 (ξ, a) = inf
P∈PaP
EP [UP (BT − ξ)] .
The value function of the Principal is then
UP,FB0 := sup
ξ∈C
sup
a∈A
{
uP0 (ξ, a)
}
, (3.1)
where the following participation constraint has to be satisfied
inf
P∈PaA
EP
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]
≥ R. (3.2)
The value function of the Principal defined by (3.1) can be then rewritten
UP,FB0 := sup
ξ∈C
sup
a∈A
{
inf
P∈PaP
EP [UP (BT − ξ)] + ρ inf
P∈PaA
EP
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]}
, (3.3)
where the Lagrange multiplier ρ > 0 is here to ensure that the participation constraint (3.2) holds.
3.1 Gâteaux differentiability and optimality
Once again, the main difficulty is that the sets PA and PP are too abstract to solve generally the problem
(3.3) directly, especially since we do not know if the two infima are attained or not. In order to overcome this
major difficulty, we will restrict the set of admissible contracts to the ones for which both the Principal and
the Agent have indeed a worst case measure. In order to do so, let us first introduce the following sets of worst
probabilities for Ψ = A,P , any contract ξ ∈ C, and any effort a ∈ A
P⋆,aΨ (ξ) :=
{
P⋆ ∈ PaΨ, inf
P∈PaΨ
EP
[
UΨ(BT − ξ)
]
= EP
⋆[
UΨ(BT − ξ)
]}
.
7See however Footnote 2 above.
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We then define
C˜ :=
{
ξ ∈ C, P⋆,aΨ (ξ) 6= ∅, Ψ = {A,P}, ∀a ∈ A
}
.
Thus, the problem (3.3) restricted to contracts in C˜ becomes
U˜P,FB0 := sup
ξ∈C˜
sup
a∈A
{
EP
⋆,a,ξ
P [UP (BT − ξ)] + ρE
P
⋆,a,ξ
A
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]}
, (3.4)
where P⋆,a,ξA and P
⋆,a,ξ
P are generic elements of P
⋆,a
A (ξ) and P
⋆,a
P (ξ) respectively.
Next, it is not extremely convenient that the two expectations above are written under different probability
measures. We will therefore use their definition to bring back all the computations under P0.
Let us start by considering the so–called Morse–Transue space on (Ω,FT ,P0) (we refer the reader to the
monographs [72, 73] for more details), defined by
Mφ :=
{
ξ := Ω −→ R, measurable, EP0 [φ(aξ)] < +∞, for any a ≥ 0
}
,
where φ is the Young function
φ(x) := exp(|x|)− 1.
Then, if Mφ is endowed with the norm
‖ξ‖φ := sup
{
EP0 [ξg], with EP0 [φ(g)] ≤ 1
}
,
it becomes a (non–reflexive) Banach space.
Then, for any a ∈ A and (αP , αA) ∈ H1
loc
(P0,R
⋆
+,F)×H
1
loc
(P0,R
⋆
+,F), we consider the map Ξ
αP ,αA
a :Mφ −→ R
defined by
Ξα
P ,αA
a (ξ) := E
P0
[
e
−RP
(∫ T
0 as(X
a,αP
· )ds+
∫ T
0 (α
P
s )
1
2 dBs−ξ(X
a,P
· )
)
+ ρe
−RA
(
ξ(Xa,α
A
· )−
∫ T
0 k(as(X
a,αA
· ))ds
)]
,
with
Xa,α
P
· (B·) :=
∫ ·
0
as(B·)ds +
∫ ·
0
(αPs (B·))
1
2dBs, X
a,αA
· (B·) :=
∫ ·
0
as(B·)ds+
∫ ·
0
(αAs (B·))
1
2 dBs.
Let now (ξ, a) ∈ C˜ × A. For Ψ = {A,P} and each P⋆Ψ ∈ P
⋆,a
Ψ (ξ) we associate the corresponding α
Ψ,⋆ (recall
(2.1)). We then have
U˜P,FB0 = sup
ξ∈C˜
sup
a∈A
{
−Ξα
P,⋆,αA,⋆
a
}
.
We will first interest ourselves to the maximisation with respect to ξ. It can be readily checked that Ξα
P,⋆,αA,⋆
a is
a strictly convex mapping in ξ, which is in addition proper and continuous. However, since Mφ is not reflexive,
we cannot claim that its minimum is attained. Nonetheless, we can still use the characterisation of a minimiser
in terms of Gâteaux derivatives. Indeed, a random variable ξ ∈Mφ which minimises Ξα
P ,αA
a necessarily satisfies
the following property
D˜Ξα
P,⋆,αA,⋆
a (ξ)[h − ξ] ≥ 0, for any h ∈M
φ, (3.5)
where D˜Ξα
P,⋆,αA,⋆
a denotes the Gâteaux derivative of Ξ
αP,⋆,αA,⋆
a given by
D˜Ξα
P,⋆,αA,⋆
a (ξ)[h] = E
P0
[
RPh(X
a,αP,⋆
· )e
−RP
(∫ T
0 as(X
a,αP,⋆
· )ds+
∫ T
0 (α
P,⋆
s )
1
2 dBs−ξ(X
a,αP,⋆
· )
)
−RAh(X
a,αA,⋆
· )ρe
−RA
(
ξ(Xa,A· )−
∫ T
0 k(as(X
a,αA,⋆
· ))ds
)]
.
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Thus, if a contract ξ⋆ ∈ C˜ satisfies the property (3.5), it is optimal for the problem (3.4).
We would like to insist on the fact that in this section, our main purpose is to propose a general method to
investigate a risk sharing problem with uncertainty on the volatility. From our understanding of the problem,
we believe that it would be extremely hard, for very general sets of ambiguity PA and PP , to not start by
studying the suboptimal problem (3.4), since the latter can be put in the much more convenient form above.
Nonetheless, we will show below that in the model that we coined "non–learning", the restriction is actually
without loss of generality, which gives hope to be able to treat the completely general case in future works.
This however goes beyond the scope of the current paper.
That being said, let us describe more precisely the modus operandi that we propose for solving the risk–sharing
problem.
Method 1. The method is divided in two steps.
(1) We restrict the study to a particular set of contracts included in C˜, which we justify intuitively. If this
problem can be solved, we can then check whether the corresponding optimal contracts satisfy the first–order
optimality conditions in (3.5).
(2) With the solution of the suboptimal problem (3.4) in hand, we can then try to show that it actually coincides
with the value function of the problem (3.3).
We need of course to say something about the choice of a pertinent subset of contracts in the first step
described above. As explained in [14, 15], when one deals with a problem in which the volatility of the output
is controlled by the Agent, contracts which are linear (in the sense of integration) with respect to the output B
and its quadratic variation 〈B〉 play a fundamental role. We thus hope (and expect) to have optimal contracts
in the following set
Q˜ :=
{
ξ ∈ C˜, ξ =
∫ T
0
ztdBt +
1
2
∫ T
0
γtd〈B〉t +
∫ T
0
δtdt, (z, γ, δ) ∈ H
2
P(R,F)× Ĥ
1
P(R,F)×H
1(R,F)
}
.
In this case, the contract ξ appears as the terminal value of a controlled diffusion process, and we expect that
the risk–sharing problem (3.4) may be solved using technics from stochastic control theory. Such a general
resolution is again beyond the scope of this paper, but we will illustrate our method by solving completely the
simplest possible case (for which the proof is already far from being trivial).
3.2 Application to the non-learning model
In this section, we illustrate the previous explanations within the "non–learning" model introduced previously
in Example 2.1. We will see then that we can actually simplify even more the set Q˜ above and introduce the
set
Q :=
{
ξ ∈ C, ξ = zBT +
γ
2
〈B〉T + δ, (z, γ, δ) ∈ R
3
}
.
Notice that the contracts are assumed to be in C and not in C˜. It will actually be one of our results that Q ⊂ C˜.
From now on, noticing that any contract ξ in Q is uniquely defined by the corresponding triplet of processes
(z, γ, δ). For any triplet (z, γ, δ), we set ξz,γ,δ := zBT +
γ
2 〈B〉T + δ. We thus aim at solving the suboptimal
problem
UP,FB0 := sup
(z,γ,δ)∈P(F)3
sup
a∈A
{
inf
P∈PaP
EP
[
UP
(
BT − ξ
z,γ,δ
)]
+ ρ inf
P∈PaA
EP
[
UA
(
ξz,γ,δ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]}
. (3.6)
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We insist on the fact that such a situation is different from the original Holmström–Milgrom [47] problem,
where the first–best contract was linear in BT , and is thus much closer to its recent generalisation in [14] where
the Agent is allowed to control the volatility of the output, where optimal contracts are shown to be linear in
BT and its quadratic variation 〈B〉T . Nonetheless, in the setting of [14], moral hazard arises from the multi–
dimensional nature of the output process, while it comes from the worst–case attitude of both the Principal
and the Agent in our framework.
3.2.1 Degeneracy for disjoints PP and PA
Our first result shows that if the sets of ambiguity of the Principal and the Agent are completely disjoint, then
there are sequences of contracts in Q such that the Principal can attain the universal upper bound 0 of his
utility, while ensuring that the Agent still receives his reservation utility R0.
Theorem 3.1. (i) Assume that αP < αA. Then, considering the sequence of contracts (ξn)n∈N⋆ and the
recommended effort amax, with
ξn :=
1
2
n〈B〉T −
T
2
nαA + δ⋆, δ⋆ := Tk(amax)−
log(−R)
RA
,
we have lim
n→+∞
uP,FB0 (ξ
n, amax) = 0 and uA0 (ξ
n, amax) = R, for any n ≥ 1.
(ii) Assume that αP > αA. Then, considering the sequence of contracts (ξn)n∈N⋆ and the recommended effort
amax, with
ξn := −
1
2
n〈B〉T +
T
2
nαA + δ⋆, δ⋆ := Tk(amax)−
log(−R)
RA
we have lim
n→+∞
uP,FB0 (ξ
n, amax) = 0 and uA0 (ξ
n, amax) = R, for any n ≥ 1.
Before proving this result, let us comment on it. We will see during the proof that when the sets of uncertainty
for the Principal and the Agent are completely disjoint, the Principal can use the quadratic variation component
in the contract in order to make appear in the exponential a term which he can make arbitrarily large, but which
is not seen at all by the Agent in his utility, as it is constructed so that it disappears under the worst–case
probability measure the Agent. This is therefore the combination of this difference between the worst–case
measures of the Principal and the Agent, as well as the fact that their uncertainty sets are disjoints which
make the problem degenerate. This is, from a mathematical point of view, quite a surprising result, which is
however not so surprising from the economics point of view. Indeed, first of all in this case the Agent and the
Principal do not somehow live in the same world, since they have totally different beliefs. Moreover, none of
them learns from the observation of the realised volatility and updates his beliefs, which makes this specific
case rather crude. However, we still believe that it can be of interest as a toy model, as long as one if careful
with the conclusions that are derived from it. We will prove later that this phenomenon also always happens
in the second–best case.
Proof. (i) First case: αA > αP. We aim at showing that the sequence of contracts (ξn) is a maximising
sequence of contracts, allowing the Principal to reach utility 0, when recommending in addition the level of
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effort amax. We have
uP0 (ξ
n, amax) = inf
P∈Pa
max
P
EP [UP (BT − ξ
n)]
= inf
P∈Pa
max
P
EP
[
−e−RP (BT−
1
2
n
∫ T
0
αPsds+
T
2
nαA−δ⋆)
]
= e−RP (
T
2
nαA−δ⋆) inf
P∈Pa
max
P
EP
[
−e−RP (
∫ T
0
(αPs)
1/2dW a
max
s +Ta
max− 1
2
n
∫ T
0
αsds)
]
= −e−RP (Ta
max+T
2
nαA−δ⋆) sup
P∈Pa
max
P
EP
[
E
(
−RP
∫ T
0
(αPs )
1/2dW a
max
s
)
× exp
(
1
2
R2P
∫ T
0
αPsds+
RP
2
n
∫ T
0
αPsds
)]
= − exp
(
−RP
(
amaxT − δ⋆ +
T
2
n(αA − αP )−
1
2
RPTα
P
))
,
where we have used the fact that for any P ∈ Pa
max
P , we have
exp
(
1
2
R2P
∫ T
0
αPsds+
RP
2
n
∫ T
0
αPsds
)
≤ exp
(
T
2
R2Pα
P +
RP
2
nTαP
)
, P− a.s.,
and that the stochastic exponential appearing above is clearly a P−martingale for any P ∈ Pa
max
P , so that the
value of the supremum is clear and attained for the measure Pα
P
amax .
Hence, we obtain uP0 (ξ
n, amax) −→ 0 when n → +∞. Since UP,FB0 ≤ 0, we deduce that the sequence (ξ
n)
approaches the best utility for the Principal when n goes to +∞. It remains to prove that for any n ∈ N⋆, ξn
is admissible, i.e., ξn satisfies
inf
P∈Pa
max
A
EP
[
UA
(
ξn −K
amax)
T
)]
≥ R, n ∈ N⋆.
Indeed,
inf
P∈Pa
max
A
EP [UA (ξ
n − Tk(amax))]
= inf
P∈Pa
max
A
EP [− exp (−RA (ξ
n − Tk(amax))]
= inf
P∈Pa
max
A
EP
[
− exp
(
−RA
(
1
2
n
∫ T
0
αPsds−
T
2
nαA + δ⋆ − Tk(amax)
))]
= − exp
(
−RA
(
δ⋆ − Tk(amax)−
T
2
nαA
))
sup
P∈Pa
max
A
EP
[
exp
(
−
RAn
2
∫ T
0
αPsds
)]
= −e−RA(δ
⋆−Tk(amax)) = R.
(ii) Second case: αA < αP. The proof is similar so that we omit it.
3.2.2 Optimal contracts with intersecting uncertainty sets
We now study the non–degenerating case by applying Method 1. We introduce the following maps, defined for
any (a, z, γ, δ, αP , αA) ∈ A× R
3 × [αP , αP ]× [αA, αA], will play an important role in what follows
F (a, z, γ, δ, αP , αA) := ΓP (a, z, γ, δ, αP ) + ρΓA(a, z, γ, δ, αA), (3.7)
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where
ΓP (a, z, γ, δ, αP ) := − exp
(
RP
(
δ − (1− z)
∫ T
0
asds+
(
RP (1− z)
2
2
+
γ
2
)
αPT
))
,
ΓA(a, z, γ, δ, αA) := − exp
(
RA
(∫ T
0
k(as)ds− z
∫ T
0
asds− δ +
(
RAz
2
2
−
γ
2
)
αAT
))
.
Let us define the subset Adet ⊂ A of actions which are deterministic. We define for any (a, z, γ, αP , αA) ∈
A×R2 × [αP , αP ]× [αA, αA],
G(a, z, γ, αP , αA) :=− ρ
RP
RA+RP
RA +RP
RP
(
RA
RP
)− RA
RA+RP
e
RARP
RA+RP
∫ T
0
(k(as)−as)ds
× e
RARP
RA+RP
(γ2 T (αP−αA)+
T
2 (αPRP (1−z)
2+αARAz
2))
.
When αP = αA, by noticing that G(a, z, γ, αP , αA) does not depend on γ we will simply write, without any
ambiguity, G(a, z, αP ) := G(a, z, γ, αP , αP ). To alleviate later computations, we partition the set Q into
Qγ :=
{
ξ ≡ (z, γ, δ) ∈ Q, γ < −RP (1− z)
2
}
,
Q|γ| :=
{
ξ ≡ (z, γ, δ) ∈ Q, −RP (1− z)
2 < γ < RAz
2
}
,
Qd :=
{
ξ ≡ (z, γ, δ) ∈ Q, −RP (1− z)
2 = γ
}
,
Qu :=
{
ξ ≡ (z, γ, δ) ∈ Q, γ = RAz
2
}
,
Qγ :=
{
ξ ≡ (z, γ, δ) ∈ Q, γ > RAz
2
}
,
and define for any (a, ξ) ∈ A× C
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) := inf
P∈PaP
EP [UP (BT − ξ)] + ρ inf
P∈PaA
EP
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]
.
The following lemma computes the Principal’s utility u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) for a recommended level of effort in Adet and
any contract ξ ∈ Q. Its proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Lemma 3.1. We have Q ⊂ C˜. Besides, fix some a ∈ Adet and some ξ ∈ Q, with ξ ≡ (z, γ, δ).
(i) If ξ ∈ Qγ, then u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a, z, γ, δ, α
P , αA).
(ii) a) If ξ ∈ Qd, then for any P ∈ PaP , E
P [UP (BT − ξ)] = inf
P∈PaP
EP [UP (BT − ξ)] , and in particular
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a, z, γ, δ, αP , α
A), for any αP ∈ [α
P , αP ].
b) If ξ ∈ Q|γ|, then u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a, z, γ, δ, α
P , αA).
c) If ξ ∈ Qu, then for any P ∈ PaA,
EP
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]
= inf
P∈PaA
EP
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]
,
and in particular u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a, z, γ, δ, α
P , αA), for any αA ∈ [α
A, αA].
(iii) If ξ ∈ Qγ , then u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a, z, γ, δ, α
P , αA).
The next lemma computes the supremum of F with respect to δ. Its proof is also relegated to the Appendix.
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Lemma 3.2. For any (a, z, γ, αP , αA) ∈ A× R×R× [α
P , αP ]× [αA, αA] we have
sup
δ∈R
F (a, z, γ, δ, αP , αA) = F (a, z, γ, δ
⋆(z, γ, αP , αA), αP , αA) = G(a, z, γ, αP , αA),
where
δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA) :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρRA
RP
)
+
∫ T
0
((RP (1− z)−RAz)as +RAk(as)) ds
−
RP
2
(RP (1− z)
2 + γ)αPT +
RA
2
(
RAz
2 − γ
)
αAT
]
.
The next lemma gives the optimal contracts and efforts in Adet and each subset of our partition of Q for the
Principal problem, for a fixed Lagrange multiplier ρ.
Lemma 3.3. Let a⋆ be the minimiser of the strictly convex map a 7−→ k(a) − a and define z⋆ := RPRA+RP .
(i) Optimal contracts in Qγ.
a) If αP < αA, then sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qγ
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a
⋆, z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆, αP , αA), where γ⋆ := −RP (1− z
⋆)2 and
δ⋆ :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RATk(a
⋆)ds+
R2ARPT
2(RA +RP )
αA
]
.
b) If αP = αA =: α˜, then sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qγ
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a
⋆, z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆, α˜, α˜), for any γ⋆ < −RP (1− z
⋆)2 and
δ⋆ :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RATk(a
⋆)
]
−
γ⋆
2
α˜T.
In these two cases sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qγ
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = G(a
⋆, z⋆, αA).
(ii) Optimal contracts in Qd.
For αP ∈ [α
P , αP ], sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qd
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a
⋆, z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆, αP , α
A) = G(a⋆, z⋆, αA), with γ⋆ := −RP (1 − z
⋆)2
and
δ⋆ :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RATk(a
⋆) +
R2ARPT
2(RA +RP )
αA
]
.
(iii) Optimal contracts in Q|γ|.
a) If αP < αA, then sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Q|γ|
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a
⋆, z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆, αP , αA) = G(a⋆, z⋆, αP ), where γ⋆ := RA|z
⋆|2
and
δ⋆ :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RATk(a
⋆)
]
−
γ⋆
2
αPT.
b) If αP = αA =: α, then sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Q|γ|
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a
⋆, z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆, α, α) = G(a⋆, z⋆, α), for any γ⋆ ∈
(−RP (1 − z
⋆)2, RA|z
⋆|2) and
δ⋆ :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RATk(a
⋆)
]
−
γ⋆
2
αT.
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c) If αP > αA, then sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Q|γ|
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a
⋆, z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆, αP , αA) = G(a⋆, z⋆, αA), where γ⋆ :=
−RP (1− z
⋆)2 and
δ⋆ :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RATk(a
⋆) +
R2ARPT
2(RA +RP )
αA
]
.
(iv) Optimal contracts in Qu.
For any αA ∈ [α
A, αA], sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qu
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a
⋆, z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆, αP , αA) = G(a
⋆, z⋆, αP ), with γ⋆ := RA|z
⋆|2
and
δ⋆ :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RATk(a
⋆)−
RAR
2
PT
2(RA +RP )
αP
]
.
(v) Optimal contracts in Qγ.
a) If αP = αA =: αˇ, then sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qγ
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a
⋆, z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆, αˇ, αˇ), for any γ⋆ > RA|z
⋆|2 and
δ⋆ :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RATk(a
⋆)
]
−
γ⋆
2
αˇT.
b) If αP > αA, then sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qγ
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a
⋆, z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆, αP , αA), with γ⋆ := RA|z
⋆|2 and
δ⋆ :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RATk(a
⋆)−
RAR
2
PT
2(RA +RP )
αP
]
.
In these two cases sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qγ
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = G(a
⋆, z⋆, αP ).
We now conclude the first step of Method 1 proposed in Section 3.1 by proving that we can indeed restrict the
study to contracts in Q, and thus solve the problem (3.3). The following lemma studies when (3.5) holds for
contracts having the form of the optimal contracts in Q. Its proof is postponed to the Appendix.
Lemma 3.4. Fix some a ∈ A and let ξa := z
⋆BT +
γ⋆
2 〈B〉T + δ
⋆(a) where γ⋆ ∈ R, and
z⋆ :=
RP
RA +RP
, δ⋆(a) :=
1
RA +RP
(
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RA
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)
+ λ, λ ∈ R.
Then,
• if RA = RP , Property (3.5) is satisfied for ξa if αP = αA.
• if RA 6= RP , Property (3.5) is satisfied for ξa if αP = αA =: α and the following condition holds
γ⋆
2
αT + λ = 0. (3.8)
We can now give our main result stating that the optimal contract in the first best problem belongs to Q. The
proof is mainly based on applying the second step of Method 1 and is postponed to the Appendix.
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Theorem 3.2. We have
(i) Assume that αA = αP . Then, the set
Qγ :=
{
ξ⋆ ≡ (z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆) ∈ Q, z⋆ =
RP
RA +RP
, γ⋆ ≥ RA|z
⋆|2,
δ⋆ = Tk(a⋆)−
RP
RA +RP
Ta⋆ +
αPT
2
(
RAR
2
P
(RA +RP )2
− γ⋆
)
−
1
RA
log(−R)
}
,
is the subset of optimal contracts in Q for the first best problem (3.1) with the optimal recommended level effort
a⋆ := argmax (k(a) − a) .
(ii) Assume that αA < αP < αA. Then, an optimal contract is given by
ξ⋆ := z⋆BT +
γ⋆
2
〈B〉T + δ
⋆,
where γ⋆ = RA(z
⋆)2, and z⋆ := RPRA+RP , δ
⋆ := Tk(a⋆)− RPRA+RP Ta
⋆ − 1RA log(−R).
(iii) Assume that αA = αP . Then, the set
Q|γ| :=
{
ξ⋆ ≡ (z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆) ∈ Q, z⋆ =
RP
RA +RP
, γ⋆ ∈ [−RP (1− z
⋆)2, RA|z
⋆|2],
δ⋆ = Tk(a⋆)−
RP
RA +RP
Ta⋆ +
αPT
2
(
RAR
2
P
(RA +RP )2
− γ⋆
)
−
1
RA
log(−R)
}
,
is the subset of optimal contracts in Q for the first best problem (3.1) with the optimal recommended level effort
a⋆ := argmax (k(a) − a) .
(iv) Assume that αP = αA. Then, the set
Qγ :=
{
ξ⋆ ≡ (z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆) ∈ Q, z⋆ =
RP
RA +RP
, γ⋆ ≤ −RP (1− z
⋆)2,
δ⋆ = Tk(a⋆)−
RP
RA +RP
Ta⋆ +
αPT
2
(
RAR
2
P
(RA +RP )2
− γ⋆
)
−
1
RA
log(−R)
}
,
is the subset of optimal contracts in Q for the first best problem (3.1) with the optimal recommended level effort
a⋆ := argmax (k(a) − a) .
(v) Assume that αP < αA < αP . Then, an optimal contract is given by
ξ⋆ := z⋆BT +
γ⋆
2
〈B〉T + δ
⋆,
where γ⋆ = −RP |1− z⋆|2, and
z⋆ :=
RP
RA +RP
, δ⋆ := Tk(a⋆)−
RP
RA +RP
Ta⋆ +
αAT
2
RARP
RA +RP
−
1
RA
log(−R).
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3.2.3 Comments and comparison with the case without ambiguity
Using Theorem 3.2, we recover the classical result that when αP = αP = αA = α
A =: α (that is to say when
there is no ambiguity), the optimal first–best contract is given by
z⋆BT +
RAR
2
Pα
2(RA +RP )2
T + Tk(a⋆)−
RP
RA +RP
Ta⋆ −
1
RA
log(−R), (3.9)
which provides the Principal with utility
−(−R0)
−
RP
RA exp
(
RPT
(
k(a∗)− a∗ +
α
2
RARP
RA +RP
))
. (3.10)
Therefore, as mentioned above, the first main difference with the ambiguity case is that in our framework,
one has in general to rely on path–dependent contracts using the quadratic variation of the output. There is
nonetheless an exception. Indeed, in the case where αA = αP , the choice γ⋆ = 0 is allowed, so that there is
a linear optimal contract in this case (which coincides with (3.9) above), and in this case only. Furthermore,
in the three cases αA = αP , αA = αP , αP = αA, we have identified uncountably many optimal contracts in
the class Q. This is really different from the case without ambiguity, where the optimal contract is essentially
unique.
Finally, let us compare the utility of the Principal can get out of the problem (since the Agent always receives
his reservation utility, there is nothing to compare for him). Again by Theorem 3.2, whenever we have αA ≤
αP ≤ αA, the Principal receives
−(−R)
−
RP
RA exp
(
RPT
(
k(a∗)− a∗ +
αP
2
RARP
RA +RP
))
,
which is always less than (3.10), for any α ∈ [αP , αP ], which means that, as intuition would dictate, the
Principal is worse off compared to the case where he would not have any aversion to ambiguity.
Then, when we have αP ≤ αA ≤ αP , the Principal gets
−(−R)
−
RP
RA exp
(
RPT
(
k(a∗)− a∗ +
αA
2
RARP
RA +RP
))
,
which is actually larger than (3.10) if α ≥ αA. In other words, compared to a situation where the Principal
would have no ambiguity, but were more pessimistic than the Agent and believed in a level of volatility higher
than αA, the ambiguity averse Principal actually obtains a larger utility.
The situation is the same, though even more extreme, when αP < αA or αA < αP , since the Principal can
reach utility 0 and is therefore always better off compared to the case without ambiguity. We nonetheless insist
once more on the fact that these results are obviously in part due to the "non–learning" assumption we made
on both the Principal and the Agent, and a deeper understanding of the problem would obviously be achieved
from studying more realistic situations. We emphasise that in the second–best problem treated below, we will
give general results allowing to solve completely the problem for general ambiguity sets, with solutions which
are amenable to numerical computations, thus opening the door to such an exploration.
4 Moral hazard and the second–best problem
We now study the so–called second best problem, corresponding to a Stackelberg–like equilibrium between the
Principal and the Agent. Now, the Principal has no control (or cannot observe) the effort level chosen by the
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Agent. Hence, his strategy is to first compute the best–reaction function of the Agent to a given contract,
and to determine his corresponding optimal effort (if it exists) and then use this in his own utility function to
maximise over all the contracts. Obviously, the above approach can only work if the Principal can actually find
the optimal effort of the Agent. Therefore, the set of admissible contracts in the second best setting must at
least be reduced to the contracts ξ such that there exists (possibly several) a⋆ ∈ A with
R ≤ UA0 (ξ) = inf
P∈Pa
⋆
A
EP
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(a⋆s)ds
)]
.
As we will see below, this set of contracts is actually equal to C, so that the above restriction is without loss of
generality.
Remark 4.1. Before turning to the solution to the moral hazard problem, notice that solving the problem of the
Agent only involves looking at the contract ξ on the support of his beliefs set PA. Therefore, the only information
about ξ that we can obtain from solving the Agent’s problem will be in a PA−quasi sure sense. Therefore, the
Principal will always have a degree of freedom when choosing the contracts on the support of PP \PA. This will
be important later on.
4.1 The Agent’s problem
The aim of this section is to prove that despite the generality of our setting, the utility of the Agent, as well
as his optimal effort, can always be characterised completely for any admissible contract ξ ∈ C. Our result
relies essentially on the recent theory of second–order BSDEs, introduced by Soner, Touzi and Zhang [87], and
revisited in a framework suitable for our purpose by Possamaï, Tan and Zhou [69].
Before starting, we will need to introduce the following spaces
• DexpPA is the set of processes Y , G
PA,+−progressively measurable, PA − q.s. càdlàg, and such that
sup
P∈PA
EP
[
exp
(
p sup
0≤t≤T
|Yt|
)]
< +∞, ∀p ≥ 0.
• IPA is the set of processes K, G
PA−predictable, PA − q.s. càdlàg and non–decreasing, null at 0 with
sup
P∈PA
EP[KpT ] < +∞, ∀p ≥ 0.
Let us next introduce the following 2BSDE
Yt = ξ−
∫ T
t
(
RA
2
|Zs|
2 α̂s + inf
a∈[0,amax]
{k(a)− aZs}
)
ds−
∫ T
t
Zsα̂
1/2
s dWs−
∫ T
t
dKs, t ∈ [0, T ], PA−q.s. (4.1)
We say that the triplet (Y,Z,K) ∈ DexpPA ×∪p≥0H
p
PA
(R,GPA)× IPA is the maximal solution to (4.1) if it indeed
satisfies (4.1) PA − q.s., if K satisfies the following minimality condition for any P ∈ PA
Kt = essinf
P
P′∈PA(P,t+)
EP
′
[KT | Ft] , P− a.s., (4.2)
and if for any other solution (Y ′, Z ′,K ′) ∈ DexpPA ×∪p≥0H
p
PA
(R,GPA)×IPA , we have Yt ≥ Y
′
t , t ∈ [0, T ], PA−q.s.
Our main result for this section is then the following representation, whose proof is deferred to the Appendix.
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Proposition 4.1. For any ξ ∈ C, the value function of the Agent verifies
UA0 (ξ) = − exp(−RAY0),
and the optimal effort of the Agent is given by the unique (a⋆(Zs))s∈[0,T ] which satisfies
inf
a∈[0,amax]
{k(a)− aZs} = k(a
⋆(Zs))− a
⋆(Zs)Zs, s ∈ [0, T ],
where (Y,Z) is the maximal solution to (4.1). Furthermore, ξ ∈ C if and only if
Y0 ≥ −
log(−R)
RA
=: R0. (4.3)
4.2 Admissible contracts
We have thus solved the problem of the Agent for any ξ ∈ C, in the sense that we have systematically found
his optimal action for a given ξ ∈ C. Along the way, we proved that any ξ ∈ C had the following decomposition
ξ = Y0 +
∫ T
0
g(Zs, α̂s)ds+
∫ T
0
Zsα̂
1/2
s dWs +
∫ T
0
dKs, PA − q.s., (4.4)
for some Z ∈ ∪p≥0HPA(R,G
PA), Y0 ≥ R0 and some K ∈ IPA satisfying the minimality condition (4.2), where
we have defined for simplicity for any (z, a) ∈ R2
g(z, a) :=
RA
2
|z|2a+ inf
a′∈[0,amax]
{
k(a′)− a′z
}
.
Notice that, as already mentioned in Remark 4.1, we only retrieved information about ξ in a PA − q.s. sense.
Conversely, let Ĉ be the set of random variables ξ such that there exist processes (Z,K) ∈ ∩p≥0H
p
PA
(R,GPA)×
IPA and some ξ̂ ∈ C such that
ξ =

ξY0,Z,K := Y0 +
∫ T
0
g(Zs, α̂s)ds+
∫ T
0
Zsα̂
1/2
s dWs +KT , PA − q.s.,
ξ̂, PP \PA − q.s.
(4.5)
The above reasoning proves that Ĉ ∩ C = C, and that an arbitrary element of Ĉ will belong to C if (Z,K)
satisfy appropriate integrability conditions ensuring that ξ satisfies (2.8). We let K be the corresponding set of
processes Z and K, which, for technical reasons, verify in addition that
E
(
−RP
∫ ·
0
α̂
1
2
s (1− Zs)dW
a⋆(Z·)
s
)
is a P−martingale, ∀P ∈ P
a⋆(Z·)
P .
Finally, we will take as admissible contracts the following class
CSB :=
{
ξ ∈ C, ∃(Y0, Z,K) ∈ [R0,+∞)×K, ξ = Y0 +
∫ T
0
g(Zs, α̂s)ds+
∫ T
0
Zsα̂
1/2
s dWs +KT , PA − q.s.
}
.
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4.3 The Principal’s problem
4.3.1 General formulation of the problem and degeneracies
From Remark 4.1 and the previous section, the Principal’s problem can always be written as
UP0 := sup
(Y0,Z,K,ξ)∈[R0,∞)×K×C
min
{
UP0 (ξ
Y0,Z,K), inf
P∈P
a⋆(Z·)
P \P
a⋆(Z·)
A
EP
[
UP
(
BT − ξ
)]}
, (4.6)
with
UP0 (ξ
Y0,Z,K) := inf
P∈P
a⋆(Z·)
P ∩P
a⋆(Z·)
A
EP
[
UP
(
BT − ξ
Y0,Z,K
)]
To simplify our study, we set the following assumption, which merely imposes a boundedness property on the
volatilities in which the Principal believes.
Assumption 4.1. There exists some positive constant M such that for any (t, ω,P) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω×PP (t, ω),
0 ≤ α̂s ≤M, P− a.s.
We then have the following result, which states that as soon as the beliefs of the Principal and the Agent are
disjoint, the problem degenerates, and the Principal can obtain his maximal possible utility, that is to say 0.
In other words, we are in a situation that is reminiscent of an arbitrage opportunity.
Proposition 4.2. Let Assumption 4.1 hold. If PP ∩ PA = ∅, then U
P
0 = 0.
Proof. First notice that from (2.4), we automatically have
UP0 = sup
ξ∈C
inf
P∈P
a⋆(Z·)
P
EP
[
UP
(
BT − ξ
)]
.
Let c ∈ R be such that −e−RA(c−k(0)T ) = R. We define the following contract in C.
ξn =

c, PA − q.s.,
−n, PP \PA − q.s.
(4.7)
The utility that the Agent receives is then
UA0 (c) = sup
a∈A
EP
a
[
−e−RA(c−
∫ T
0
k(as)ds)
]
= −e−RA(c−k(0)T ) = R,
using the definition of c. We now turn to the Principal’s utility. We directly have for any a ∈ A
UP0 ≥ inf
P∈PaP \P
a
A
EP [UP (BT + n)]
= e−RPn inf
P∈PaP \P
a
A
EP
[
−e−RPBT
]
= e−RPn inf
P∈PaP \P
a
A
EP
[
−E
(
−RP
∫ T
0
α̂
1
2
s dW
a
s
)
e−RP
∫ T
0
asdse
R2P
2
∫ T
0
α̂sds
]
≥ −e−RPn+R
2
PT/2M .
Thus, UP0 ≥ limn→+∞
inf
P∈PaP \P
a
A
EP [UP (BT + n)] = 0. Since the reverse inequality is trivial, this ends the proof.
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The case PP ∩PA = ∅ can be seen as a non realistic approach to the problem, since the Agent and the Principal
have completely disjoint estimates on the volatility. We now turn to a more realistic case, where we assume
that PP ∩PA 6= ∅. We then have the following proposition which simplifies greatly the problem of the Principal
(4.6)
Proposition 4.3. Let Assumption 4.1 hold. If PP ∩ PA 6= ∅,
UP0 = sup
(Y0,Z,K)∈[R0,∞)×K
inf
P∈P
a⋆(Z·)
P ∩P
a⋆(Z·)
A
EP
[
UP
(
BT − ξ
Y0,Z,K
)]
. (4.8)
Proof. We have UP0 = sup
ξ∈CSB
U˜P0 (ξ), where for any ξ ∈ C
SB
U˜P0 (ξ) := sup
ξ˜∈C˜
min
UP0 (ξ), inf
P∈P
a⋆(Z
ξ
· )
P \P
a⋆(Z
ξ
· )
A
EP
[
UP
(
BT − ξ˜
)] .
Notice that the first term in the minimum does not depend on ξ˜. Furthermore, we know by Proposition 4.2
that for any ξ ∈ CSB
0 = sup
ξ˜∈C˜
inf
P∈P
a⋆(Z
ξ
· )
P \P
a⋆(Z
ξ
· )
A
EP
[
UP
(
BT − ξ˜
)]
≥ UP0 (ξ).
Therefore, U˜P0 (ξ) = U
P
0 (ξ).
From now on, we will always assume that PP ∩ PA 6= ∅ and that Assumption 4.1 holds, since we have already
solved the other case in Proposition 4.2.
4.3.2 A sub–optimal version of (4.8)
From (4.5) and Proposition 4.3, we know that we can restrict our attention to contracts of the form ξY0,Z,K.
However, in order to solve this problem, we actually need to have more information on the non–decreasing
process K. Using similar intuitions as the ones given in [14, 15], we expect that when the contract ξ is
sufficiently "smooth", we can find a GP
A
−predictable process Γ such that for every P ∈ P
a⋆(Zξ· )
A
Kt =
∫ t
0
(
1
2
α̂sΓs − inf
a∈R
{
1
2
aΓs + 1a∈D(s,B·)
})
ds, (4.9)
where the indicator function 1a∈D(t,ω) is the one from convex analysis, and is equal to 0 when a indeed belongs
to D(t, ω), and +∞ otherwise. However, in general, such a decomposition for K is not true for every ξ ∈ CSB.
We will therefore start by solving the Principal problem for a particular sub–class of contracts in CSB such that
the process Γ exists, and then show, under appropriate assumptions, that the Principal’s value function is not
actually affected by this restriction. For simplicity, we denote by K the set of processes Z and Γ such that Γ is
GP
A
−predictable and (Z,KΓ) ∈ K, where
KΓt :=
∫ t
0
(
1
2
α̂sΓs − inf
a∈R
{
1
2
aΓs + 1a∈D(s,B·)
})
ds.
Building upon (4.4) and (4.9), we consider the class CSB ⊂ CSB of contracts ξ admitting the decomposition
ξ = Y Y0,Z,ΓT for some Y0 ≥ R0, and some (Z,Γ) ∈ K, where for any t ∈ [0, T ]
Y Y0,Z,Γt := Y0 +
∫ t
0
(
1
2
α̂sΓs − inf
α∈R
{
1
2
αΓs + 1α∈D(s,B·)
}
+ g(Zs, α̂s)
)
ds+
∫ t
0
Zsα̂
1/2
s dWs, PA − q.s. (4.10)
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Remark 4.2. Let us say a word about implementability of the contracts in the class CSB. They can actually be
rewritten as follows
Y Y0,Z,ΓT = Y0 +
1
2
∫ T
0
Γsd〈B〉s −
∫ T
0
(
inf
α∈R
{
1
2
αΓs + 1α∈D(s,B·)
}
+ g(Zs, α̂s)
)
ds+
∫ T
0
ZsdBs, PA − q.s.
Therefore, the Principal should be able to reward the Agent using the path of B, which could easily be done in
practice using stocks on the value B of the firm, or forward contracts for instance (one would then of course have
to approximate the stochastic integral by a finite Riemann sum). The term involving the quadratic variation
is more complex however. Since it is deeply linked to the volatility of the output, one could try to replicate
it using variance swaps contracts or log contracts, which are known to be linked to this quadratic variation.
This is in line with the classical managerial compensation using stock options for instance. Another important
point to realise is that, in general, the Principal can substitute in the contract the quadratic variation by d(B2t )
instead, without losing too much utility. This point has been raised recently by Aïd, Possamaï and Touzi [2]
in a Principal–Agent problem for electricity pricing where the Agent (the client) controls the variability of his
consumption. Their numerical results show that the loss of utility for the Principal when doing this substitution
is not that large in many situations. We believe that this result should still hold in our framework, which would
provide a more practical way to implement the optimal contract.
We define the following sub–optimal problem for the Principal
UP0 := sup
Y0≥R0
UP0 (Y0), (4.11)
where for any Y0 ≥ R0
UP0 (Y0) := sup
(Z,Γ)∈K
inf
P∈P
a⋆(Z·)
P ∩P
a⋆(Z·)
A
EP
[
UP
(
BT − Y
Y0,Z,Γ
T
)]
.
Notice first that by linearity of Y Y0,Z,Γ in Y0 and the fact that UP is non–decreasing, we deduce immediately
that
UP0 = U
P
0 (R0).
Now, all the interest of concentrating on UP0 (R) is that it is simply the value function of zero–sum stochastic
differential game, under weak formulation, with the two controlled state variables B and Y R0,Z,Γ, with controls
(Z,Γ) ∈ K for the Principal and α̂ for the "Nature", and dynamics
Bt =
∫ t
0
a⋆(Zs)ds +
∫ t
0
α̂1/2s dW
a⋆(Z·)
s , t ∈ [0, T ], PA ∩ PP − q.s.,
Y R0,Z,Γt = R0 +
∫ t
0
(
1
2
α̂sΓs − inf
a∈R
{
1
2
aΓs + 1a∈D(s,B·)
}
+
RA
2
α̂s|Zs|
2 + k(a⋆(Zs))
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
Zsα̂
1/2
s dW
a⋆(Z·)
s , t ∈ [0, T ], PA ∩ PP − q.s.
Under this form, the sub–optimal problem of the Principal becomes amenable to the dynamic programming
approach to differential games, and in particular, in a Markovian setting, UP0 can be linked to the associated
Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs (HJBI for short) PDE. The aim of the next section is to take advantage of
this representation of the value function to prove that the restriction to contracts in CSB is, under natural
assumptions, without loss of generality.
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4.3.3 The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs approach
As mentioned above, we now restrict our attention to the Markovian setting8, which requires the following
assumption.
Assumption (M). For Ψ ∈ {A,P} and any (s, ω) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω, we have, abusing notations slightly
DΨ(s, ω) = DΨ(s,Bs(ω)).
We next define for any 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T , (Z,K) ∈ K and y ∈ R
Y t,y,Z,Ks := y +
∫ s
t
(
RA
2
|Zr|
2 α̂r + inf
a∈[0,amax]
{k(a)− aZr}
)
dr +
∫ s
t
Zrα̂
1/2
r dWr +
∫ T
t
dKr, s ∈ [t, T ].
Since our setting is now Markovian, we can simplify the notations for the ambiguity sets of the Principal and
the Agent to PP (t, x) and PA(t, x), for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R. Consider now the dynamic version of the value
function of the Principal
u(t, x, y) := sup
(Z,K)∈K
inf
P∈P
a⋆(Z·)
P (t,x)∩P
a⋆(Z·)
A (t,x)
EP
[
UP
(
BT − Y
t,y,Z,K
T
)]
.
Since it is clear from the definition of Y t,y,Z,K = y + Y t,0,Z,K, we deduce immediately that
u(t, x, y) = −eRP yv(t, x),
where
v(t, x) := inf
(Z,K)∈K
sup
P∈P
a⋆(Z·)
P (t,x)∩P
a⋆(Z·)
A (t,x)
EP
[
e−RP (BT−Y
t,0,Z,K
T )
]
. (4.12)
We are now going to make a series of assumptions concerning the function v defined above. These assumptions
will be related to standard properties of stochastic control or stochastic differential games, and although expected
and standard, they may be quite hard to prove in an extremely general setting. We will comment on this further
after the statement of the assumptions themselves.
Assumption (PPD). The map v is continuously differentiable in time on [0, T ], and twice continuously differ-
entiable with respect to x on R. Besides, for any family
{
θZ,K,P, (Z,K) ∈ K, P ∈ P
a⋆(Z·)
P ∩ P
a⋆(Z·)
A
}
of stopping
times independent of Ft, we have
v(t, x) = inf
(Z,K)∈K
sup
P∈P
a⋆(Z·)
P (t,x)∩P
a⋆(Z·)
A (t,x)
EP
[
v(θZ,K,P, BθZ,K,P)e
RP Y
t,0,Z,K
θZ,K,P
]
. (4.13)
Furthermore, there exists (Z⋆,K⋆) ∈ K such that
v(t, x) = sup
P∈P
a⋆(Z⋆· )
P (t,x)∩P
a⋆(Z⋆· )
A (t,x)
EP
[
v(θZ
⋆,K⋆,P, BθZ⋆,K⋆,P)e
RP Y
t,0,Z⋆,K⋆
θZ
⋆,K⋆,P
]
. (4.14)
8Actually, our approach would also work in non–Markovian case, provided that one uses the recently developed theory of
viscosity solutions for path–dependent PDEs, in a series of papers by Ekren, Keller, Ren, Touzi and Zhang [27, 28, 29, 75, 76, 77].
We preferred to present our arguments in the Markovian case to avoid additional technicalities. See however Section 5 for a specific
non–Markovian case.
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First of all, the smoothness assumption on v is for simplicity and because we do not want to add an extra layer
of technicalities by having to rely on the notion of viscosity solutions. However, the same line of reasoning
would still go through in that case. Next, roughly speaking, (4.13) means that we are assuming that v satisfies
the dynamic programming principle. For standard stochastic control problems, this is a result known to hold in
extremely general settings (see for instance [32, 33] for a recent account). However, it has been known that this
is a much more complex problem for differential games, since the seminal paper on the subject by Fleming and
Souganidis [37]. However, such results have already been proved in the literature, for instance by Buckdahn
and Li [10], or Bouchard, Moreau and Nutz [8]. The fact that we take it as an assumption here is once more
mainly for simplicity, and because we want to give a general idea on the strategy of proof that we think should
be used. The verification itself of whether the dynamic programming principle holds should be done on a case
by case basis. We also want to insist on the fact that we only require this principle to hod in order to be able to
relate the value function of the game to the associated HJBI PDE. Therefore, any other approach not requiring
this principle and still allowing to prove such a relationship would work for us. This would be the case for the
so–called stochastic viscosity solutions introduced by Bayraktar and Sîrbu for instance, see [3, 4, 85]. Finally,
Relation (4.14) simply stipulates that there is an optimal control in the maximisation part of the problem of
the Principal. This could be in principle relaxed to the existence of ε−optimal controls.
Define next the map G : [0, T ]× R6 × R+ −→ R for any (t, x, v, p, q, z, γ, α) ∈ [0, T ]× R5 × R+ by
G(t, x, v, p, q, z, γ, α) = a⋆(z)p +
(
RA
2
α|z|2 + k(a⋆(z)) +
1
2
αγ − inf
α˜∈R+
{
1
2
α˜γ + 1α˜∈DA(t,x)
})
RP v
+
1
2
αq +
1
2
α|z|2R2P v + αzRP v + 1α∈DP(t,x).
We can then introduce the following HJBI equation, which should be related to our problem.−∂tψ(t, x) − supα∈R+ inf(z,γ)∈R2G(t, x, ψ, ∂xψ, ∂xxψ, z, γ, α) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R,
ψ(T, x) = e−RP x, x ∈ R.
(4.15)
Our strategy now is to prove that both the value function of the original and sub–optimal problems of the
Principal solve this PDE. Then, by a uniqueness argument (which will require a further assumption), we will
be able to affirm that they are equal.
First, we introduce the notion of (classical) super–solution to PDE (4.15).
Definition 4.1. A map v from [0, T ] × R into R is a smooth super–solution to PDE (4.15) if v is once
continuously differentiable in time and twice continuously differentiable with respect to x and satisfies−∂tv(t, x)− supα∈R+ inf(z,γ)∈R2G(t, x, v(t, x), ∂xv(t, x), ∂xxv(t, x), z, γ, α) ≥ 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R,
v(T, x) = e−RP x, x ∈ R.
(4.16)
We now assume that a comparison theorem for the HJBI equation (4.15) holds, and that the latter admits a
unique classical solution, which by a standard verification argument would then be equal to the dynamic version
of the value function of the sub–optimal problem of the Principal. This is why (4.17) below holds in this case.
Assumption (C). There exists a unique smooth solution ψ to PDE (4.15) such that ψ is once continuously
differentiable with respect to time and twice continuously differentiable with respect to x such that
−eRPR0ψ(0, 0) = UP0 . (4.17)
Moreover, assume that v is a smooth super–solution to PDE (4.15) then for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R we have
ψ(t, x) ≤ v(t, x).
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We finally consider an extra technical assumption, ensuring that the maximum in the Hamiltonian of the HJBI
equation is attained and that the corresponding maximiser is sufficiently "smooth".
Assumption (A). We assume that for any (t, x, v, p, q) ∈ [0, T ) × R4, there exists a maximiser α˜(t, x, v, p, q)
for the map
α 7−→ inf
(z,γ)∈R2
G(t, x, v, p, q, z, γ, α),
such that the following SDE has a unique strong solution
Xt =
∫ t
0
α˜(s,Xs, v(s,Xs), ∂xv(s,Xs), ∂xxv(s,Xs))dBs, P0 − a.s.
The following lemma will be useful in the sequel.
Lemma 4.1. Under Assumptions (M), (PPD) and (A), we can define for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R a probability
measure P˜ ∈ P
a⋆(Z⋆· )
P (t, x) ∩ P
a⋆(Z⋆· )
A (t, x) such that
α̂t = α˜
(
t, Bt, v(t, Bt), ∂xv(t, Bt), ∂xxv(t, Bt)
)
, dt⊗ P˜− a.e. (4.18)
Moreover, let ϕ be a map from [0, T ]×R into R+ \{0}. Then, there is a sequence (Γ⋆,n)n∈N of G
PA−predictable
processes such that
EP˜
[∫ T
0
ϕ(r,Br)dK
⋆
r −
∫ T
0
ϕ(r,Br)k
⋆,n
r dr
]
−→
n→+∞
0, (4.19)
with
k⋆,nr :=
1
2
α̂rΓ
⋆,n
r − inf
a∈R
{
1
2
aΓ⋆,nr + 1a∈DA(r,Br)
}
, r ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. Assumption (A) provides directly the existence of the probability P˜ ∈ P
a⋆(Z⋆· )
P (t, x)∩P
a⋆(Z⋆· )
A (t, x). Next,
we set
HT :=
∫ T
0
ϕ(r,Br)dK
⋆
r ≥ 0, P˜− a.s.
Then, since ϕ is a positive function, there exists by standard density arguments a sequence of non–negative
predictable processes (k⋆,n)n∈N such that
EP˜
[
HT −
∫ T
0
ϕ(r,Br)k
⋆,n
r dr
]
−→
n→+∞
0.
Fix some ω in the support of the probability measure P˜. We will now prove that the map
st(ω, ·) : γ 7−→
1
2
α˜(t, Bt(ω), v(t, Bt(ω)), ∂xv(t, Bt(ω)), ∂xxv(t, Bt(ω)))γ − inf
a∈R
{
1
2
aγ + 1a∈DA(t,Bt(ω))
}
,
is surjective from R into R+.
First notice that since α˜(t, Bt(ω), v(t, Bt(ω)), ∂xv(t, Bt(ω)), ∂xxv(t, Bt(ω))) ∈ DA(t, Bt(ω)), we have st(ω, γ) ≥
0. Indeed, st(ω, 0) = 0, and if γ > 0, we have
st(ω, γ) =
1
2
γ (α˜(t, Bt(ω), v(t, Bt(ω)), ∂xv(t, Bt(ω)), ∂xxv(t, Bt(ω)))− a−(t, Bt(ω))) ≥ 0,
and if γ < 0,
st(ω, γ) =
1
2
γ (α˜(t, Bt(ω), v(t, Bt(ω)), ∂xv(t, Bt(ω)), ∂xxv(t, Bt(ω)))− a+(t, Bt(ω))) ≥ 0,
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where we defined
a−(t, Bt(ω)) := inf
a∈R
{
a+ 1a∈D(t,Bt(ω))
}
, a+(t, Bt(ω)) := sup
a∈R
{
a− 1a∈DA(t,Bt(ω))
}
.
Next, it is clear that if a−(t, Bt(ω)) < α˜(t, Bt(ω), v(t, Bt(ω)), ∂xv(t, Bt(ω)), ∂xxv(t, Bt(ω))) < a+(t, Bt(ω)),
then st(ω, γ) goes to +∞ as γ goes to ±∞. Besides, if α˜(t, Bt(ω), v(t, Bt(ω)), ∂xv(t, Bt(ω)), ∂xxv(t, Bt(ω))) =
a−(t, Bt(ω)) (resp. a+(t, Bt(ω))), then by letting γ −→ −∞ (resp. γ −→ +∞) we still have st(ω, γ) → +∞.
Hence, the surjectivity of st(ω, ·) from R into R
+ is clear, since this map is also continuous. Thus, using a
classical mesurable selection argument we deduce that for any n ∈ N, there exists a GPA−predictable process
Γn,⋆ ∈ IPA such that
k⋆,nt (·) = st(·,Γ
n,⋆
t (·)).
Thus the approximation (4.19) holds.
Proposition 4.4. Let Assumptions (M), (PPD), (A) and (C) hold. Then v is a super–solution of HJB
equation (4.15) in the sense of Definition 4.1.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. We assume that there exists (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ) × R and δ > 0
−∂tv(t0, x0)− sup
α∈R+
inf
(z,γ)∈R2
G(t0, x0, v(t0, x0), ∂xv(t0, x0), ∂xxv(t0, x0), z, γ, α) ≤ −3δ < 0.
Using the continuity of the function v and Assumption (A), we know that for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R there
exists α˜(t, x, v(t, x), ∂xv(t, x), ∂xxv(t, x)) ∈ R
+ and there exists ε > 0 such that for any (t, x) in V(t0, x0) :=
[t0, (t0 + ε) ∧ T ) × B(x0, ε), where B(x0, ε) denotes the ball centered at x0 with radius ε, we have for any
(z, γ) ∈ R2
∂tv(t, x) +G(t, x, v(t, x), ∂xv(t, x), ∂xxv(t, x), z, γ, α˜(t, x, v(t, x), ∂xv(t, x), ∂xxv(t, x))) ≥ 2δ. (4.20)
For any ν := (Z,Γ) ∈ K and P ∈ P
a⋆(Z·)
P (t0, x0)∩P
a⋆(Z·)
A (t, x), let θ
ν,P be the first exit time of (t, Bt, Y
t0,0,ν
t ) of
V(t0, x0)× B(y0, ε). Using Assumption (PPD) we have
0 = inf
ν∈K
sup
P∈P
a⋆(Z·)(t0,x0)
P ∩P
a⋆(Z·)
A (t0,x0)
EP
[
v(θν,P, Bθν,P)e
RP Y
t0,0,ν
θν,P − v(t0, x0)
]
= sup
P∈P
a⋆(Z·)
P (t0,x0)∩P
a⋆(Z·)
A (t0,x0)
EP
[
v(θν
⋆,P, Bθν⋆,P)e
RP Y
t0,0,ν
⋆
θν
⋆,P − v(t0, x0)
]
,
with ν⋆ := (Z⋆,K⋆). Since Assumption (A) holds, we have a probability P˜ ∈ P
a⋆(Z·)
P (t0, x0) ∩ P
a⋆(Z·)
A (t0, x0)
such that (4.18) holds. Denote for simplicity
α˜r := α˜(r,Br, v(r,Br), ∂xv(r,Br), ∂xxv(r,Br)).
We thus obtain by applying Itô’s formula
0 ≥ EP˜
[
v(θν
⋆,P˜, B
θν⋆,P˜
)e
RP Y
t0,0,ν
⋆
θν
⋆,P˜ − v(t0, x0)
]
= EP˜
[∫ θν⋆,P˜
t0
eRPY
t0,0,ν
⋆
r (∂tv(r,Br) +G(r,Br, v(r,Br), ∂xv(r,Br), ∂xxv(r,Br), Z
⋆
r ,Γ
n,⋆
r , α˜r)
]
+ EP˜
[∫ θν⋆,P˜
t0
eRPY
t0,0,ν
⋆
r v(r,Br) (dK
⋆
r − k
⋆,n
r dr)
]
,
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using the same notation that those in Lemma 4.1 with the choice ϕ = v (we recall that by definition v > 0).
From (4.19), we deduce that there exists n0 ∈ N such that for any n ≥ n0,
EP˜
[∫ θν⋆,P˜
t0
eRP Y
t0,0,ν
⋆
r v(r,Br) (dK
⋆
r − k
⋆,n
r dr)
]
≥ −δ.
Using (4.20), we finally get for n ≥ n0
0 ≥ EP˜
[
v(θν
⋆,P˜, B
θν⋆,P˜
)e
RP Y
t0,0,ν
⋆
θν
⋆,P˜ − v(t0, x0)
]
≥ δ > 0,
which provides the desired contradiction. Thus f is a super–solution of (4.15).
Corollary 4.1. Let Assumptions 4.1, (M), (PPD), (A), (C) hold. Then,
UP0 = U
P
0 (4.21)
Proof. From Proposition 4.4 together with Assumption (C), we deduce that
UP0 = −e
RPR0v(0, 0) ≤ −eRPR0ψ(0, 0) = UP0 .
The other inequality being clear by definition, this concludes the proof.
4.3.4 Application to the non-learning model
In this section, we concentrate on the "non–learning" model. Instead of following the general approach outlined
above (which works also in this simple setting), we follow an alternative route and compute directly and
explicitly the value function of the Principal. By the above calculations, we immediately have that
UP0 = sup
(Z,Γ)∈U
inf
P∈P
a⋆(Z·)
P
EP
[
−E
(
−RP
∫ T
0
α̂1/2s (1− Zs)dW
a⋆(Z·)
s
)
eRP (R0−
∫ T
0
H(α̂s ,Zs,Γs)ds)
]
,
where
H(α, z, γ) := a⋆(z)− k(a⋆(z)) −
α
2
(
RAz
2 +RP (1− z)
2
)
−
1
2
αγ + inf
α∈[αA,α
A]
{
1
2
αγ
}
. (4.22)
In order to pursue the computations, we need to specify a form for the cost function k. Namely, we will assume
in what follows that
Assumption 4.2. The cost function of the Agent is quadratic, defined, for some k > 0, by
k(a) := k
a2
2
, a ≥ 0.
We deduce from Proposition 4.1 that the Agent chooses the control a⋆(z) = zk . Hence, Equality (4.22) can be
rewritten
H(α, z, γ) =
z
k
−
z2
2k
−
α
2
(
RAz
2 +RP (1− z)
2
)
−
1
2
αγ + inf
α∈[αA,α
A]
{
1
2
αγ
}
=: Hz(α, z) +Hγ(α, γ), (4.23)
where
Hz(α, z) :=
z
k
−
z2
2k
−
α
2
(
RAz
2 +RP (1− z)
2
)
, Hγ(α, γ) := −
1
2
αγ + inf
α∈[αA,α
A]
{
1
2
αγ
}
.
Notice that for any α ≥ 0
H(αA, z, 0) = H(α, z,−RAz
2 −RP (1− z)
2). (4.24)
The following lemma computes the maximum of the map (z, γ) 7−→ H(α, z, γ), depending on the value of
α ∈ R+.
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Lemma 4.2. We distinguish three cases.
(i) If αA ≤ α ≤ αA, then (z, γ) 7−→ H(α, z, γ) admits a (global) maximum at
z⋆(α) :=
1 + kαRP
1 + αk(RA +RP )
, γ⋆ := 0. (4.25)
(ii) If α < αA, γ 7−→ H(α, z, γ) is increasing and attains its maximum at γ⋆ = +∞, with H(α, z, γ⋆) = +∞.
(iii) If αA < α, γ 7−→ H(α, z, γ) is decreasing and attains its maximum at γ⋆ = −∞, with H(α, z, γ⋆) = +∞.
Proof. We have
∂H
∂z
(α, z, γ) =
∂Hz
∂z
(α, z) =
1
k
−
z
k
− α(RAz −RP (1− z)),
so that
∂H
∂z
(α, z, γ) = 0⇐⇒ z = z⋆(α) :=
1 + kαRP
1 + αk(RA +RP )
.
Since z 7−→ Hz(α, z) is concave for any α ≥ 0, we deduce that the maximum of Hz is attained at z⋆(α).
Furthermore, for any γ 6= 0
∂H
∂γ
(α, z, γ) =
∂Hγ
∂γ
(α, γ) =
1
2
(αA − α)1γ>0 +
1
2
(αA − α)1γ<0.
If αA ≤ α ≤ αA, then (z, γ) 7−→ H(α, z, γ) admits a global maximum at (z⋆(α), 0) which proves (i). Then, (ii)
and (iii) are clear.
We can now state the main result of this section, which gives the optimal contracts for the second–best problem,
when contracts are restricted to the class CSB.
Theorem 4.1. Let Assumption 4.2 hold. Define for any α ≥ 0
z⋆(α) :=
1 + kαRP
1 + αk(RA +RP )
.
(i) If αA ≤ αP ≤ αA, then an admissible optimal contract is given by ξR0,z
⋆(αP ),0. In this case,
UP0 = − exp
(
−RP (TH(α
P , z⋆(αP ), 0) −R0)
)
.
(ii) If αP ≤ αA ≤ αP , then an admissible optimal contract is given by ξR0,z
⋆(αA),γ⋆ , where γ⋆ := −RA(z
⋆(αA))2−
RP (1− z
⋆(αA))2. In this case,
UP0 = − exp
(
−RP (TH(α
A, z⋆(αA), γ⋆)−R0)
)
.
(iii) Assume that αP < αA. Then UP0 = 0.
(iv) Assume that αA < αP . Then UP0 = 0.
We now prove the following result.
Theorem 4.2. Let Assumption 4.2 hold. Then
UP0 = U
P
0 .
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Proof. First of all, notice that when αP < αA or αA < αP , we have U
P
0 = 0, so that U
P
0 = 0 as well. Let us
now assume that αA ≤ αP ≤ αA. Since KT ≥ 0, we easily have
UP0 ≤ sup
ξ∈CSB
E
Pα
P
a⋆(Z
ξ
· )
[
−E
(
−RP
∫ T
0
(αP )
1
2 (1− Zξs )dW
a⋆(Zξ· )
s
)
e
RP
(
R0−
∫ T
0 f(Z
ξ
s ,α
P )ds
)]
.
Then, we easily have that the map z 7−→ f(z, αP ) attains its maximum at z⋆(αP ), where it is actually equal to
H(αP , z⋆(αP ), 0). Thus
UP0 ≤ e
RPR0e−RP TH(α
P ,z⋆(αP ),0) = UP0 ,
by Theorem 4.1(i).
Assume now that αP ≤ αA ≤ αP . Then, with the same arguments
UP0 ≤ sup
ξ∈CSB
E
Pα
P
a⋆(Z
ξ
· )
[
−E
(
−RP
∫ T
0
(αA)
1
2 (1− Zξs )dW
a⋆(Zξ· )
s
)
e
RP
(
R0−
∫ T
0
f(Zξs ,α
A)ds
)]
≤ eRPR0e−RPTH(α
A,z⋆(αA),0) = UP0 ,
by Theorem 4.1(ii).
4.4 Comments
The comparison with the case without ambiguity is actually very similar to the first best problem. First, notice
that when αP ∈ [αA, αA], an optimal contract can be chosen to be linear in the terminal value of the output,
and it is actually the exact same contract as the optimal one for a Principal who would only believe in a constant
volatility process equal to αP . Since the utility of the Principal is then a decreasing function of the volatility,
this means that the Principal always gets less utility than in a context without ambiguity.
However, as soon as αA ∈ [αP , αP ], the second–best optimal contract makes use of the quadratic variation of
the output and is therefore path–dependent. Besides, as in the first–best case, the Principal may get an higher
utility level than in the case without ambiguity.
Finally, in the degenerated cases (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 4.1, we have seen that the optimal effort for the
Agent is equal to 0 since z∗ = 0 and a∗(z∗) = 0, on the contrary to the first–best problem where, in the same
case, the optimal level of effort for the Agent, chosen by the Principal to obtained his best utility 0, was amax.
Hence, to solve the second–best problem, the Agent does not provide any effort and attains his reservation
utility. It can be explained by the fact that in the second–best problem, an optimal contract is a Stackelberg
equilibrium, where the Principal has to anticipate the reaction of the Agent given an admissible contract, unlike
the first–best problem for which the Principal chooses the level of effort for the Agent.
5 Possible extensions and comparison with the literature
In this section, we examine several potential generalizations of the problem at hand, and we try to explain how
to tackle it in each case.
5.1 More general dynamics
The first possible extension would be to consider an output with more general dynamics. Typically, one could
have a general non–Markovian model where
Bt =
∫ t
0
bs(B·, a
P
s , α
P
s )ds +
∫ t
0
σs(B·, α
P
s )dW
aP
s , P− a.s.,
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that is to say that the impact of the effort choice of the Agent on the drift of the output is now non–linear, and
the value of this drift may also depend on the past values of the output itself, which could model some synergy
effects.
Furthermore, the cost function k could also take the form ks(B·, a
P
s , α
P
s ).
In the first–best problem, if the map b actually only depends on a, and not on B and α, and if k does not
depend on B, then it is not difficult to see that our approach will still work, albeit with more complicated
computations. Notably, the optimal effort of the Agent will either be amax or any (deterministic) minimizer of
a 7−→ ks(a)− bs(a) (which exist since k is super–linear). It is however not clear to us how to handle the general
dynamics.
In the second–best problem, the representation of the value function of the Agent in terms of 2BSDEs will always
work, provided that one can indeed check that it is well–posed (which requires obviously some assumptions on k
and b). Then, in the Markovian case, our approach depicted above using the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs
(HJBI) equation
−∂tu(t, x, y)− inf
α∈R+
sup
(z,γ)∈R2
{
bt(x, a
⋆
t (x, z, α), α)∂xu(t, x, y) +
(
kt(x, a
⋆
t (x, z, α), α) +
1
2
σ2t (x, α)(γ +RAz
2)
− inf
α˜∈R+
{
1
2
σ2t (x, α˜)γ + 1σ2t (x,α˜)∈DA(t,x)
})
∂yu(t, x, y) +
1
2
σ2t (x, α)∂xxu(t, x, y)
+
1
2
σ2t (x, α)(z
2∂yyu+ z∂xyu)(t, x, y) + 1σ2t (x,α)∈DP (t,x)
}
, (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ) × R2,
v(T, x, y) = UP (x− y), (x, y) ∈ R
2,
where a⋆t (x, z, α) is the unique (for simplicity)
9 minimizer of the map a 7−→ kt(x, a, α) − bt(x, a, α)z.
A particular non–Markovian case could prove very interesting in this framework. It would correspond to the
case where the for Ψ = A,P
DΨ(t, ω) = DΨ(t, Bt(ω), 〈B〉t(ω)), (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω,
which means that the Principal and the Agent update their beliefs according to both the current value of the
output and of its quadratic variation. In this case, we could simply consider 〈B〉 as an additional state variable,
with dynamics
〈B〉t =
∫ t
0
σ2s(B·, α
P
s )ds, P− a.s.,
and have then an HJBI PDE with 3 state variables, thus avoiding to have to rely on the theory of path–dependent
PDEs (recall Footnote 8).
5.2 More general utility functions
Another possible generalization would be to go beyond the case of exponential utility functions for the Principal
and the Agent. As usual, if the utility of the Agent is separable (that is to say if the cost comes out of the
utility), then the 2BSDE characterisation of his value function would still hold. The main problem would then
be to solve the Principal problem. Once again, one could write down an HJBI equation similar to the one above
and try to study it.
9If the minimizer is not unique, then we assume as usual that the Principal has sufficient bargaining power to make the Agent
choose the best minimizer for him. This means that one has also to take the supremum over all minimizers in the Hamiltonian
above.
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5.3 Comparison with [94]
As mentioned in the Introduction, independently of our work, Sung [94] has studied a similar model of Principal–
Agent with ambiguity. For the sake of understanding the specificities of these two approaches, we will now list
what we believe are the main differences.
(i) The modelisation considered in [94] is roughly the same as the one we described in Section 5.1 above in
terms of the dynamics of the output. As explained, our approach would work similarly in such a context.
(ii) There is a first important difference in terms of the ambiguity sets. Indeed, as far as we understand it,
[94] considers that the Principal and the Agent share the exact same ambiguity set D, which is defined
through a map pi satisfying the KKT conditions or the Slater constraint qualification conditions (see [94,
page 12] for more details). In our work, we do not require any of these conditions, and our modelisation
allows for general, and different ambiguity sets for the Principal and the Agent. The only assumptions
we impose on these sets are the ones necessary so that the dynamic programming principle holds, which
are necessary to ensure that the problem of the Agent is time–consistent, and allows as a consequence to
characterise it through 2BSDEs.
(iii) Another important difference lies in the choice of admissible contracts. In [94], the author takes right
from the start as class of admissible contracts the terminal values at time T of some semi–martingales
with a triplet of characteristics which is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, of
a form similar to our ξY0,Z,Γ, see Equation (11) and Theorem 1 in [94]. As far as we can understand
it, [94] justifies this choice through informal arguments, with which we obviously agree, and claims (see
[94, Footnote 14]) that the restriction is without loss of generality, but without any proof. We do not
understand this point, since, as we proved it in Proposition 4.1, the value function of the Agent is always
represented through a 2BSDE, in which there is the non–decreasing process K. However, it is known that
such a process is not always absolutely continuous, for any choice of ξ. Indeed, Peng, Song and Zhang [65]
have characterised completely the set of random variables for which this was the case in the context of
our non–learning model, and proved that integrability was not a sufficient condition. Therefore, it is our
understanding that it is a result by itself, and actually one of the important contributions of our work, to
justify10 that the restriction is without loss of generality, which we explain how to do for general models,
and prove under natural assumptions.
(iv) The last difference lies in the methods used to solve the problem itself. First of all, the specification
of the model is similar in both papers, which had to be expected, since this is the natural way to give
the weak formulation for stochastic control problems or differential games. As for the problem of the
Agent, since [94] concentrates on a class of contracts similar to our CSB, the problem becomes a simple
verification result, and doesn’t have to rely on the 2BSDE theory. We feel that the main difference resides
in the approach to the Principal’s problem. In [94, Theorems 3 and 4], the author characterises the value
function of the Principal through some predictable process ZP , for which existence is obtained, but, as
far as we understand it, no explicit construction is given. The only exemple where the author manages
to compute this ZP roughly corresponds to our "non–learning" model, see [94, Proposition 1]. In this
regard, our method based on HJBI PDEs (or path–dependent PDEs in the non–Markovian case, see Pham
and Zhang [66]) provides a clear way to compute, at least numerically11, both the value function of the
10One could argue that it suffices to use the same arguments as in [15] to obtain this result, however their argument does not go
through in this case, as we already explained earlier.
11Numerical schemes in the Markovian case are by now extremely well–known, schemes for PPDEs have recently been considered
by Zhang and Zhuo [100], and Ren and Tan [74].
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Principal and the associated optimal contract, even in very general models. We believe that this is of the
utmost importance for the practical application of this theory.
(iv) Finally, we would like to point out that we believe that [94] may be more finance oriented, and as a result
provides arguments and explanations which may prove more accessible for a less technical audience. We
therefore believe that the two papers complement each other very well, and [94] is an excellent companion
to our work, especially in terms of studying the managerial implications of the results that we have both
obtained, which are described at length in [94].
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Let a ∈ Adet and ξ ≡ (z, γ, δ) ∈ Q. We compute on the one hand
inf
P∈PaP
EP [UP (BT − ξ)] = −e
RP (δ−(1−z)
∫ T
0 asds) sup
P∈PaP
EP
[
E
(
RP (z − 1)
∫ T
0
(αPs )
1
2 dW as
)
e
RP
2 (RP (1−z)
2+γ)
∫ T
0
αPsds
]
.
Hence, using the fact that the stochastic exponential appearing above is a true martingale under any P ∈ PaP ,
we deduce easily that
inf
P∈PaP
EP [UP (BT − ξ)] =

ΓP (a, z, γ, δ, α
P ), if γ < −RP (1− z)
2
ΓP (a, z, γ, δ, α
P ), if γ > −RP (1− z)
2
EP [UP (BT − ξ)] , ∀P ∈ P
a
P if γ = −RP (1− z)
2.
(A.1)
We compute on the other hand
inf
P∈PaA
EP
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]
= inf
P∈PaA
EP
[
−e−RA(zBT+
γ
2
∫ T
0 α
P
sds+δ−
∫ T
0 k(as)ds)
]
= −eRA(
∫ T
0
k(as)ds−δ−z
∫ T
0
asds) sup
P∈PaP
EP
[
E
(
−RAz
∫ T
0
(αPs )
1
2 dW as
)
e
RA
(
RAz
2
2
− γ
2
)∫ T
0 α
P
sds
]
.
Hence,
inf
P∈PaA
EP
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]
=

ΓA(a, z, γ, δ, α
A), if γ < RAz
2,
ΓA(a, z, γ, δ, α
A), if γ > RAz
2,
EP
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]
, ∀P ∈ PaA if γ = RAz
2.
(A.2)
By combining (A.1) and (A.2) and using the definition (3.7), we conclude the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Let (a, z, γ, αP , αA) ∈ A × R × R × [α
P , αP ] × [αA, αA]. First notice that the map
δ 7−→ F (a, z, γ, δ, αP , αA) is clearly concave (we remind the reader that ρ > 0). Using the first order condition
for δ, we obtain after some calculations
δ =
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+ (RP (1− z)−RAz)
∫ T
0
asds+RA
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
−
RP
2
(RP (1− z)
2 + γ)αPT +
RA
2
(
RAz
2 − γ
)
αAT
]
,
which ends the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3. (i) From Lemma 3.1(i) together with Lemma 3.2, we have
sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qγ
inf
P∈PaP
EP [UP (BT − ξ)] + ρ inf
P∈PaA
EP
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]
= sup
a∈Adet
sup
z∈R
sup
γ<−RP (1−z)2
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA), αP , αA),
where
δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA) :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+
∫ T
0
((RP (1− z)−RAz)as +RAk(as)) ds
−
RP
2
(RP (1− z)
2 + γ)αPT +
RA
2
(
RAz
2 − γ
)
αAT
]
,
and where we recall that then
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA), αP , αA) =− ρ
RP
RA+RP
RA +RP
RP
(
RA
RP
)− RA
RA+RP
e
RARP
RA+RP
(
∫ T
0 (k(as)−as)ds+
γ
2
T (αP−αA))
× e
RARP
RA+RP
T
2 (α
PRP (1−z)
2+αARAz
2)
.
a) Assume that αP < αA. Then γ 7−→ F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA), αP , αA) is increasing for γ < −RP (1− z)
2
and is thus maximal at γ⋆(z) := −RP (1− z)
2. Hence, by setting
δ⋆(z) :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+ (RP (1− z)−RAz)
∫ T
0
asds+RA
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
+
RAT
2
(
RAz
2 +RP (1− z)
2
)
αA
]
,
we have
sup
a∈Adet
sup
z∈R
sup
γ<−RP (1−z)2
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA), αP , αA) = sup
a∈Adet
sup
z∈R
F (a, z, γ⋆(z), δ⋆(z), αP , αA),
with
F (a, z, γ⋆(z), δ⋆(z), αP , αA) = −ρ
RP
RA+RP
RA +RP
RP
(
RA
RP
)− RA
RA+RP
e
RARP
RA+RP
(
∫ T
0 (k(as)−as)ds+
T
2
αA(RP (1−z)2+RAz2)).
Hence, by choosing z⋆ := RPRA+RP , a
⋆ the constant minimiser of k(a)− a, γ⋆ = −RP (1− z
⋆)2 and
δ⋆ := δ⋆(z⋆) =
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RATk(a
⋆) +
R2ARPT
2(RA +RP )
αA
]
,
we have
sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qγ
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a
⋆, z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆, αP , αA)
= −ρ
RP
RA+RP
RA +RP
RP
(
RA
RP
)− RA
RA+RP
exp
(
RARP
RA +RP
T (k(a⋆)− a⋆) +
T
2
R2AR
2
P
(RA +RP )2
αA
)
.
b) Assume that αP = αA =: α˜. Then γ 7−→ F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, α˜, α˜), α˜, α˜) is constant for γ < −RP (1 − z)
2.
Hence for any γ < −RP (1− z)
2
sup
a∈Adet
sup
z∈R
sup
γ<−RP (1−z)2
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA), αP , αA) = sup
a∈Adet
sup
z∈R
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, α˜, α˜), α˜),
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where
δ⋆(z, γ, α˜) :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+ (RP (1− z)−RAz)
∫ T
0
asds+RA
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
(R2Az
2 −R2P (1− z)
2)α˜
T
2
]
−
γ
2
α˜T,
and
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ), α˜, α˜) = −ρ
RP
RA+RP
RA +RP
RP
(
RA
RP
)− RA
RA+RP
e
RARP
RA+RP
(
∫ T
0 (k(as)−as)ds+
T
2
α˜(RP (1−z)2+RAz2)).
Hence, by choosing z⋆ := RPRA+RP , a
⋆ the constant minimiser of k(a)−a, for γ⋆ any value in (−∞,−RP (1−z
⋆)2)
and
δ⋆ := δ⋆(z⋆, γ⋆) =
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RATk(a
⋆)
]
−
γ⋆
2
α˜T,
we have
sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qγ
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a
⋆, z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆, α˜, α˜)
= −ρ
RP
RA+RP
RA +RP
RP
(
RA
RP
)− RA
RA+RP
exp
(
RARPT
RA +RP
(
k(a⋆)− a⋆ +
RARP
2(RA +RP )
α˜
))
.
(ii) From Lemma 3.1(ii)a), together with Lemma 3.2, we have for any αP ∈ [α
P , αP ]
sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qd
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = sup
a∈Adet
sup
z∈R
F (a, z, γ⋆, δ⋆(z, γ⋆, αA), αP , α
A),
where γ⋆ = −RP (1− z)
2, and
δ⋆(z, γ⋆, αA) :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+ (RP (1− z)−RAz)
∫ T
0
asds+RA
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
+
RA
2
(
RAz
2 +RP (1− z)
2
)
αAT
]
,
with also
F (a, z, γ⋆, δ⋆(z, γ, αA), αP , α
A) = −
RA +RP
RP
ρRPRARP
RA

RA
RA+RP
e
RARP
RA+RP
(
∫ T
0 (k(as)−as)ds+
T
2
αA(RP (1−z)2+RAz2)),
which does not depend on αP . Hence, by choosing z
⋆ := RPRA+RP , a
⋆ the constant minimiser of k(a) − a,
γ⋆ = −RP (1− z
⋆)2 and
δ⋆ :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RATk(a
⋆) +
R2ARPT
2(RA +RP )
αA
]
,
we have
sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qd
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a
⋆, z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆, αP , α
A)
= −ρ
RP
RA+RP
RA +RP
RP
(
RA
RP
)− RA
RA+RP
exp
(
RARPT
RA +RP
(
k(a⋆)− a⋆ +
RARP
2(RA +RP )
αA
))
.
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(iii) From Lemma 3.1(ii)b) together with Lemma 3.2, we have
sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Q|γ|
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = sup
a∈Adet
sup
z∈R
sup
−RP (1−z)2<γ<RAz2
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA), αP , αA),
where
δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA) :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+
∫ T
0
((RP (1− z)−RAz)as +RAk(as)) ds
−
RP
2
(RP (1− z)
2 + γ)αPT +
RA
2
(
RAz
2 − γ
)
αAT
]
,
and with
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA), αP , αA) =− ρ
RP
RA+RP
RA +RP
RP
(
RA
RP
)− RA
RA+RP
e
RARP
RA+RP
(
∫ T
0
(k(as)−as)ds+
γ
2
T (αP−αA))
× e
RARP
RA+RP
T
2 (α
PRP (1−z)
2+αARAz
2)
.
a) Assume that αP < αA. Then γ 7−→ F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA), αP , αA) is increasing for −RP (1 − z)
2 <
γ < RAz
2 and is maximal at γ⋆(z) := RAz
2. Hence, by setting
δ⋆(z) :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+ (RP (1− z)−RAz)
∫ T
0
asds+RA
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
−
RPT
2
(
RAz
2 +RP (1− z)
2
)
αP
]
,
we have
sup
a∈Adet
sup
z∈R
sup
−RP (1−z)2<γ<RAz2
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA), αP , αA) = sup
a∈Adet
sup
z∈R
F (a, z, γ⋆(z), δ⋆(z), αP , αA),
with
F (a, z, γ⋆(z), δ⋆(z), αP , αA) = −ρ
RP
RA+RP
RA +RP
RP
(
RA
RP
)− RA
RA+RP
e
RARP
RA+RP
(
∫ T
0
(k(as)−as)ds+
T
2
αP (RP (1−z)2+RAz2)).
Hence, by choosing z⋆ := RPRA+RP , a
⋆ the constant minimiser of k(a)− a, γ⋆ = RA|z
⋆|2 and
δ⋆ := δ⋆(z⋆) =
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RATk(a
⋆)−
RAR
2
PT
2(RA +RP )
αP
]
,
we have
sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Q|γ|
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a
⋆, z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆, αP , αA)
= −ρ
RP
RA+RP
RA +RP
RP
(
RA
RP
)− RA
RA+RP
exp
(
RARP
RA +RP
T (k(a⋆)− a⋆) +
T
2
R2AR
2
P
(RA +RP )2
αP
)
.
b) Assume that αP = αA =: α. Then γ 7−→ F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, α, α), α, α) is constant for −RP (1− z)
⋆ < γ <
RAz
2. Hence for any γ ∈ (−RP (1− z)
2, RAz
2)
sup
a∈Adet
sup
z∈R
sup
γ∈(−RP (1−z)2,RAz2)
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA), αP , αA) = sup
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z∈R
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ), α, α),
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where
δ⋆(z, γ) :=
1
RA +RP
[
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+(RAz
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γ
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and with
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ), α, α) = −ρ
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RA+RP
e
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(
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T
2
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Hence, by choosing z⋆ := RPRA+RP , a
⋆ the constant minimiser of k(a)− a, any γ⋆ ∈ (−RP (1− z)
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2) and
δ⋆ := δ⋆(z⋆, γ⋆) =
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[
log
(
ρ
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)
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−
γ⋆
2
αT,
we have
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a∈Adet
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RARP
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α
))
.
c) Assume that αP > αA. The proof is exactly the same as in the case αP < αA, and we obtain, with
z⋆ = RPRA+RP , γ
⋆ = −RP (1− z
⋆)2, and
δ⋆ :=
1
RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RATk(a
⋆) +
R2ARPT
2(RA +RP )
αA
]
,
that
sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qu
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a
⋆, z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆, αP , αA)
= −ρ
RP
RA+RP
RA +RP
RP
(
RA
RP
)− RA
RA+RP
exp
(
RARP
RA +RP
T (k(a⋆)− a⋆) +
T
2
R2AR
2
P
(RA +RP )2
αA
)
.
(iv) The proof is similar to the case (ii). It suffices to change αA into αP and choose γ⋆ = RA|z
⋆|2.
(v) From Lemma 3.1(iii) together with Lemma 3.2, we have
sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qγ
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = sup
a∈Adet
sup
z∈R
sup
γ>RAz2
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA), αP , αA),
where
δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA) :=
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RA +RP
[
log
(
ρ
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)
+
∫ T
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((RP (1− z)−RAz)as +RAk(as)) ds
−
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2
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2 + γ)αPT +
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2
(
RAz
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)
αAT
]
,
and with
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA), αP , αA) =− ρ
RP
RA+RP
RA +RP
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(
RA
RP
)− RA
RA+RP
e
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(
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γ
2
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× e
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T
2 (α
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2+αARAz
2)
.
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a) Assume that αP = αA =: αˇ. Then γ 7−→ F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, αˇ, αˇ), αˇ, αˇ) is constant for γ > RAz
2. Hence
for any γ > RAz
2
sup
a∈Adet
sup
z∈R
sup
γ>RAz2
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA), αP , αA) = sup
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and
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ), αˇ, αˇ) = −ρ
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e
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2
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Hence, by choosing z⋆ := RPRA+RP , a
⋆ the constant minimiser of k(a)− a, any γ⋆ > RA|z
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δ⋆ := δ⋆(z⋆, γ⋆) =
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ρ
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−
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we have
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RARP
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.
b) Assume that αP > αA. Then γ 7−→ F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA), αP , αA) is decreasing for γ > RAz
2 and is
maximal at γ⋆(z) := RAz
2. Hence, by setting
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,
we have
sup
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γ>RAz2
F (a, z, γ, δ⋆(z, γ, αP , αA), αP , αA) = sup
a∈Adet
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F (a, z, γ⋆(z), δ⋆(z), αP , αA),
with
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e
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∫ T
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T
2
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Hence, by choosing z⋆ := RPRA+RP , a
⋆ the constant minimiser of k(a)− a, γ⋆ = RA|z
⋆|2 and
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,
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we have
sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qγ
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = F (a
⋆, z⋆, γ⋆, δ⋆, αP , αA)
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.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. For any a ∈ A, let us define ξa := z
⋆BT +
γ⋆
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⋆(a) where γ⋆ ∈ R,
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Then, for any h ∈Mφ
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(A.3)
where
dPαP0
dP0
:= E
(
−
RPRA(αP )
1
2
RA +RP
BT
)
,
dPαA0
dP0
:= E
(
−
RPRA(αA)
1
2
RA +RP
BT
)
.
Assume that αP = αA =: α. Then, if RA = RP or if RA 6= RP and Property (3.8) holds then we automatically
have
D˜ΞαP ,αAa (ξ)[h − ξa] = 0,
which proves the first result.
Proof of Theorem 3.2 . We begin by proving (i). Assume that αA = αP . First notice that
UP,FB0 ≤ sup
ξ∈C
sup
a∈A
{
EP
αP
a [UP (BT − ξ)] + ρE
P
αA
a
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]}
= −inf
ξ∈C
inf
a∈A
Ξα
P ,αA
a (ξ),
where we have used the fact that by definition, the law of B under Pαa is equal to the law of X
a,α under P0.
Let us then define for any a ∈ A
ξa := z
⋆BT +
γ⋆
2
〈B〉T + δ
⋆(a),
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where γ⋆ ∈ [RA(z
⋆)2,+∞), and
z⋆ :=
RP
RA +RP
, δ⋆(a) :=
1
RA +RP
(
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RA
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)
−
γ⋆
2
αPT.
Then by Lemma 3.4, we know that
inf
ξ∈C
inf
a∈A
Ξα
P ,αA
a (ξ) = inf
a∈A
Ξα
P ,αA
a (ξa).
We then have
Ξα
P ,αA
a (ξa) =ρ
RP
RA+RP
(
RA
RP
)− RA
RA+RP RP +RA
RP
e
αPT
R2AR
2
P
2(RA+RP )
2
× EP0
[
E
(
−
RARP
RA +RP
(αP )1/2BT
)
e
RARP
RA+RP
∫ T
0 (k(as(X
a,αP
· ))−as(X
a,αP
· ))ds
]
,
so that we clearly have
inf
a∈A
Ξα
P ,αA
a (ξa) = Ξ
αP ,αA
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Thus we have obtained
UP,FB0 ≤ −Ξ
αP ,αA
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Conversely, we have from Lemma 3.3 (iv) and (v) a.,
UP,FB0 ≥ sup
ξ∈Qγ
sup
a∈Adet
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = G(a
⋆, z⋆, αP ) = −Ξ
αP ,αA
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Therefore
UP,FB0 = −Ξ
αP ,αA
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Finally, it remains to choose ρ so as to satisfy the participation constraint of the Agent. Some calculations
show that it suffices to take ρ such that
1
RA +RP
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
= −
1
RA
log(−R0) +
RP
RA +RP
T
[
k(a⋆)− a⋆ + αPT
RARP
2(RA +RP )
]
.
Thus,
δ(a⋆) = Tk(a⋆)−
RP
RA +RP
Ta⋆ +
αPT
2
(
RAR
2
P
(RA +RP )2
− γ⋆
)
−
1
RA
log(−R).
We now turn to (ii). Since we have αA < αP < αA, we deduce that
UP,FB0 ≤ sup
ξ∈C
sup
a∈A
{
EP
αP
a [UP (BT − ξ)] + ρE
Pα
P
a
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]}
= −inf
ξ∈C
inf
a∈A
Ξα
P ,αP
a (ξ).
Let us then define for any a ∈ A
ξa := z
⋆BT +
γ⋆
2
〈B〉T + δ
⋆(a),
where γ⋆ = RA(z
⋆)2, and
z⋆ :=
RP
RA +RP
, δ⋆(a) :=
1
RA +RP
(
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RA
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)
−
γ⋆
2
αPT.
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Then by Lemma 3.4, we know that
inf
ξ∈C
inf
a∈A
Ξα
P ,αP
a (ξ) = inf
a∈A
Ξα
P ,αP
a (ξa).
We then have
Ξα
P ,αP
a (ξa) =
(
ρ
RA
RP
) RP
RA+RP
(
1 +
RP
RA
)
e
αPT
R2AR
2
P
2(RA+RP )
2
× EP0
[
E
(
−
RARP
RA +RP
(αP )1/2BT
)
e
RARP
RA+RP
∫ T
0
(k(as(X
a,αP
· ))−as(X
a,αP
· ))ds
]
,
so that we clearly have
inf
a∈A
Ξα
P ,αP
a (ξa) = Ξ
αP ,αP
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Thus we have obtained
UP,FB0 ≤ −Ξ
αP ,αP
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Conversely, using Lemma 3.3(iv) we have
UP,FB0 ≥ sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qu
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = G(a
⋆, z⋆, αP ) = −Ξα
P ,αP
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Therefore
UP,FB0 = −Ξ
αP ,αP
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Finally, it remains to choose ρ so as to satisfy the participation constraint of the Agent. Some calculations
show that it suffices to take ρ such that
1
RA +RP
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
= −
1
RA
log(−R) +
RP
RA +RP
T
[
k(a⋆)− a⋆ + αPT
RARP
2(RA +RP )
]
.
Thus,
δ(a⋆) = Tk(a⋆)−
RP
RA +RP
Ta⋆ +
αPT
2
(
RAR
2
P
(RA +RP )2
− γ⋆
)
−
1
RA
log(−R)
= Tk(a⋆)−
RP
RA +RP
Ta⋆ −
1
RA
log(−R).
We now turn to (v). Since we have αP < αA < αP , we deduce that
UP,FB0 ≤ sup
ξ∈C
sup
a∈A
{
EP
αA
a [UP (BT − ξ)] + ρE
Pα
A
a
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]}
= −inf
ξ∈C
inf
a∈A
Ξα
A,αA
a (ξ).
Let us then define for any a ∈ A
ξa := z
⋆BT +
γ⋆
2
〈B〉T + δ
⋆(a),
where γ⋆ = −RP |1− z
⋆|2, and
z⋆ :=
RP
RA +RP
, δ⋆(a) :=
1
RA +RP
(
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RA
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)
−
γ⋆
2
αAT.
Then by Lemma 3.4, we know that
inf
ξ∈C
inf
a∈A
Ξα
A,αA
a (ξ) = inf
a∈A
Ξα
A,αA
a (ξa).
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We then have
Ξα
A,αA
a (ξa) =
(
ρ
RA
RP
) RP
RA+RP
(
1 +
RP
RA
)
e
αAT
R2AR
2
P
2(RA+RP )
2
× EP0
[
E
(
−
RARP
RA +RP
(αA)1/2BT
)
e
RARP
RA+RP
∫ T
0 (k(as(X
a,αA
· ))−as(X
a,αA
· ))ds
]
,
so that we clearly have
inf
a∈A
Ξα
A,αA
a (ξa) = Ξ
αA,αA
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Thus we have obtained
UP,FB0 ≤ −Ξ
αA,αA
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Conversely, using Lemma 3.3 (ii) we have
UP,FB0 ≥ sup
a∈Adet
sup
ξ∈Qd
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = G(a
⋆, z⋆, αA) = −Ξα
A,αA
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Therefore
UP,FB0 = −Ξ
αA,αA
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Finally, it remains to choose ρ so as to satisfy the participation constraint of the Agent. Some calculations
show that it suffices to take ρ such that
1
RA +RP
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
= −
1
RA
log(−R) +
RP
RA +RP
T
[
k(a⋆)− a⋆ + αAT
RARP
2(RA +RP )
]
.
Thus,
δ(a⋆) = Tk(a⋆)−
RP
RA +RP
Ta⋆ +
αAT
2
(
RAR
2
P
(RA +RP )2
− γ⋆
)
−
1
RA
log(−R)
= Tk(a⋆)−
RP
RA +RP
Ta⋆ +
αAT
2
RARP
RA +RP
−
1
RA
log(−R).
We now prove (iii). Assume that αA = αP , and notice that
UP,FB0 ≤ sup
ξ∈C
sup
a∈A
{
EP
αP
a [UP (BT − ξ)] + ρE
Pα
A
a
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]}
= −inf
ξ∈C
inf
a∈A
Ξα
P ,αA
a (ξ),
where we have used the fact that by definition, the law of B under Pαa is equal to the law of X
a,α under P0.
Let us then define for any a ∈ A
ξa := z
⋆BT +
γ⋆
2
〈B〉T + δ
⋆(a),
where γ⋆ ∈ [−RP |1− z
⋆|2, RA|z
⋆|2], and
z⋆ :=
RP
RA +RP
, δ⋆(a) :=
1
RA +RP
(
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RA
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)
−
γ⋆
2
αPT.
Then by Lemma 3.4, we know that
inf
ξ∈C
inf
a∈A
Ξα
P ,αA
a (ξ) = inf
a∈A
Ξα
P ,αA
a (ξa).
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We then have
Ξα
P ,αA
a (ξa) =
(
ρ
RA
RP
) RP
RA+RP
(
1 +
RP
RA
)
e
αPT
R2AR
2
P
2(RA+RP )
2
× EP0
[
E
(
−
RARP
RA +RP
(αP )1/2BT
)
e
RARP
RA+RP
∫ T
0
(k(as(X
a,αP
· ))−as(X
a,αP
· ))ds
]
,
so that we clearly have
inf
a∈A
Ξα
P ,αA
a (ξa) = Ξ
αP ,αA
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Thus we have obtained
UP,FB0 ≤ −Ξ
αP ,αA
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Conversely, we have from Lemma 3.3 (ii), (iii)b), (iv),
UP,FB0 ≥ sup
ξ∈Q|γ|
sup
a∈Adet
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = G(a
⋆, z⋆, αP ) = −Ξα
P ,αA
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Therefore
UP,FB0 = −Ξ
αP ,αA
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Finally, it remains to choose ρ so as to satisfy the participation constraint of the Agent. Some calculations
show that it suffices to take ρ such that
1
RA +RP
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
= −
1
RA
log(−R0) +
RP
RA +RP
T
[
k(a⋆)− a⋆ + αPT
RARP
2(RA +RP )
]
.
Thus,
δ(a⋆) = Tk(a⋆)−
RP
RA +RP
Ta⋆ +
αPT
2
(
RAR
2
P
(RA +RP )2
− γ⋆
)
−
1
RA
log(−R).
We finally prove (iv). Assume that αP = αA, and notice that
UP,FB0 ≤ sup
ξ∈C
sup
a∈A
{
EP
αP
a [UP (BT − ξ)] + ρE
Pα
A
a
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)]}
= −inf
ξ∈C
inf
a∈A
Ξα
P ,αA
a (ξ),
where we have used the fact that by definition, the law of B under Pαa is equal to the law of X
a,α under P0.
Let us then define for any a ∈ A
ξa := z
⋆BT +
γ⋆
2
〈B〉T + δ
⋆(a),
where γ⋆ ∈ (−∞,−RP |1− z
⋆|2], and
z⋆ :=
RP
RA +RP
, δ⋆(a) :=
1
RA +RP
(
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
+RA
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)
−
γ⋆
2
αPT.
Then by Lemma 3.4, we know that
inf
ξ∈C
inf
a∈A
Ξα
P ,αA
a (ξ) = inf
a∈A
Ξα
P ,αA
a (ξa).
We then have
Ξα
P ,αA
a (ξa) =
(
ρ
RA
RP
) RP
RA+RP
(
1 +
RP
RA
)
e
αPT
R2AR
2
P
2(RA+RP )
2
× EP0
[
E
(
−
RARP
RA +RP
(αP )1/2BT
)
e
RARP
RA+RP
∫ T
0
(k(as(X
a,αP
· ))−as(X
a,αP
· ))ds
]
,
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so that we clearly have
inf
a∈A
Ξα
P ,αA
a (ξa) = Ξ
αP ,αA
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Thus we have obtained
UP,FB0 ≤ −Ξ
αP ,αA
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Conversely, we have from Lemma 3.3 (i) b., (ii) and (iii) c.,
UP,FB0 ≥ sup
ξ∈Qγ
sup
a∈Adet
u˜P,FB0 (a, ξ) = G(a
⋆, z⋆, αP ) = −Ξα
P ,αA
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Therefore
UP,FB0 = −Ξ
αP ,αA
a⋆ (ξa⋆).
Finally, it remains to choose ρ so as to satisfy the participation constraint of the Agent. Some calculations
show that it suffices to take ρ such that
1
RA +RP
log
(
ρ
RA
RP
)
= −
1
RA
log(−R) +
RP
RA +RP
T
[
k(a⋆)− a⋆ + αPT
RARP
2(RA +RP )
]
.
Thus,
δ(a⋆) = Tk(a⋆)−
RP
RA +RP
Ta⋆ +
αPT
2
(
RAR
2
P
(RA +RP )2
− γ⋆
)
−
1
RA
log(−R).
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Our fist step is to look at the dynamic version of the value function of the Agent. Fix
some a ∈ A. We refer to the papers [59, 56] for the proofs that, for any FT−measurable contract ξ ∈ C, one can
define a process, which we denote by uAt (ξ, a) (denoted by Yt in [56]), which is càdlàg, G
PA,+−adapted (recall
that for any a ∈ A, GP
a
A = GPA , since the polar sets of PaA are the same as the polar sets of PA) and such that
uAt (ξ, a) = essinf
P
P
′∈PaA(P,t
+)
EP
′
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
t
k(as)ds
)∣∣∣∣Ft] , P− a.s., for all P ∈ PaA. (A.4)
Notice that since ξ ∈ C, it has exponential moments of any order, so that since in addition the effort process a
is bounded, we have that uA(ξ, a) has moments of any order, in the sense that
sup
a∈A
sup
P∈PaA
EP
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣uAt (ξ, a)∣∣p
]
< +∞, for all p ≥ 0, (A.5)
where we have used the generalized Doob inequality for sub–linear expectations given in Proposition A.1 in
[68].
Moreover, by [56, step 2 in the proof of Theorem 2.3], eRA
∫ t
0 k(as)dsuAt (ξ, a) is a (P,G
PA,+)−sub–martingale for
every P ∈ PaA, and by [56, step 3 in the proof of Theorem 2.3], there is a G
PA−predictable process Z˜, and a
family of non–decreasing and FP−predictable processes (K˜P)P∈PaA , such that, for all P ∈ P
a
A
eRA
∫ t
0
k(as)dsuAt (ξ, a) = e
RA
∫ T
0
k(as)dsUA(ξ)−
∫ T
t
Z˜sα̂
1
2
s dW
a
s − K˜
P
T + K˜
P
t , P− a.s.
Notice also that since every probability measure in PA is equivalent, by definition, to a probability measure
in PaA (and conversely), the above also holds P − a.s., for any P ∈ PA, with the convention that we will still
denote by K˜P the non-decreasing process associated to P ∈ PaA or PA. Moreover, using the aggregation result
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of [57], we can actually aggregate the family K˜P into a universal process, which is GPA−predictable, and which
we denote by K˜.
Define
Y at := −
ln
(
−uAt (ξ, a)
)
RA
, Zat := −
e−RA
∫ t
0
k(as)ds
RAut(ξ, a)
Z˜t, K
a
t := −
∫ t
0
e−RA
∫ s
0
k(ar)dr
RAu
A
t (ξ, a)
dK˜r.
We have, after some computations, for all P ∈ PA
Y at = ξ −
∫ T
t
(
RA
2
|Zas |
2 α̂s + k(as)− asZ
a
s
)
ds−
∫ T
t
Zas α̂
1/2
s dWs −
∫ T
t
dKas , P− a.s.
Now notice that by (A.5), we immediately have
sup
a∈A
sup
P∈PA
EP
[
exp
(
p sup
0≤t≤T
|Y at |
)]
< +∞, for every p ≥ 0.
Moreover, remember that by (A.4), we also have for every P ∈ PaA, by the exact same arguments as above
applied under any fixed measure P ∈ PA, that
Y at = essinf
P
P
′∈PaA(P,t
+)
YP
′
,a
t , P− a.s., (A.6)
where for any P ∈ PaA, (Y
P,a,ZP,a) is the unique12 solution to the following BSDE defined under P
YP,at = ξ −
∫ T
t
(
RA
2
∣∣∣ZP,as ∣∣∣2 α̂s + k(as)− asZP,as ) ds− ∫ T
t
ZP,as α̂
1/2
s dWs, P− a.s.
Then, using (A.5), we can follow the proof of Lemma 3.1 in [70]13 to obtain that Za actually belongs to the
BMO space defined in [70] (see Section 2.3.2). Then, we can follow exactly the proof of Theorem 6.1 in [70] to
obtain with (A.6), that for any P ∈ PaA
Kat = essinf
P
P
′∈PaA(P,t
+)
EP
′
[KaT | Ft] , P− a.s.
Therefore, (Y at , Z
a
t ) is the unique solution to the (quadratic-linear) 2BSDE with terminal condition ξ and
generator RA/2z
2α̂s + k(as)− asz (see for instance Definition 2.3 of [70]).
The final step of the proof is now to relate the family (Y a)a∈A with the solution of the 2BSDE (4.1). Before
proceeding, let us explain why the 2BSDE (4.1) does indeed admit a maximal solution. First of all, the
corresponding quadratic BSDEs admit a maximal solution, because, since the infimum in the generator is over
a compact set, the generator of the BSDE is bounded from above by a function with linear growth in z. The
existence of a maximal solution is then direct from Proposition 4 of [9]. Furthermore, since this maximal solution
is obtained as a monotone approximation of Lipschitz BSDEs, it satisfies a comparison theorem. Hence, we
can apply first Proposition 2.1 of [69] to obtain the existence of a maximal solution of the 2BSDE, in the sense
of Definition 4.1 of [69], and then use Remark 4.1 of [69] to aggregate the family of non-decreasing processes
into K (we remind the reader that all the measures in PA satisfy the predictable martingale representation
property).
In particular, we have the following representation for any P ∈ PA,
Yt = essinf
P
P
′∈PaA(P,t
+)
YP
′
t , P− a.s., (A.7)
12Wellposedness is clear here, since we have easily that YP,at = −
1
RA
log
(
−EP
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
t
k(as)ds
)∣∣∣Ft
])
, P− a.s.
13In this result, ξ and Y a are assumed to be bounded, but the proof generalizes easily to our setting where Y a satisfies (A.5).
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where for any P ∈ PaA, (Y
P,ZP) is the maximal solution of the quadratic BSDE
YPt = ξ −
∫ T
t
(
RA
2
∣∣∣ZPs ∣∣∣2 α̂s + inf
a∈[0,amax]
{
k(a)− aZPs
})
ds−
∫ T
t
ZPs α̂
1/2
s dWs, P− a.s.
Now it is a classical result dating back to [30, 31, 42] (see also [51] for a similar result using 2BSDEs) that, using
the comparison theorem satisfied by the maximal solution of the 2BSDEs (which is automatically inherited from
the one satisfied by the BSDEs), that
Y0 = sup
a∈A
Y a0 = sup
a∈A
inf
P∈PaA
YP,a0 = sup
a∈A
inf
P∈PaA
{
−
1
RA
log
(
−EP
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
k(as)ds
)])}
,
so that
UA0 (ξ) = − exp(−RAY0).
Furthermore, it is then clear, since the function k is strictly convex that there is some a⋆(Z·) ∈ A such that
inf
a∈[0,amax]
{k(a)− aZs} = k(a
⋆(Zs))− a
⋆(Zs)Zs, s ∈ [0, T ].
This implies that Y0 = inf
P∈P
a⋆(Z·)
A
Y
P,a⋆(Z·)
0 .
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We recall Definition (4.25) for any α ≥ 0
z⋆(α) :=
1 + kαRP
1 + αk(RA +RP )
.
We begin with the proof of (i). Assume that αA ≤ αP ≤ αA, then
UP0 ≥ inf
P∈P
a⋆(z⋆(α̂·))
P
EP
[
−E
(
−RP
∫ T
0
α̂
1
2
s (1− z
⋆(α̂s))dW
a⋆(z⋆)
s
)
eRP (R0−
∫ T
0
H(α̂s,z⋆(α̂s),0)ds)
]
.
Then we have for any α ≥ 0
H(α, z⋆(α), 0) = −
α
2
RP +
(1 + αkRP )
2
2k(1 + αk(RA +RP ))
.
Hence,
∂H
∂α
(α, z⋆(α), 0) =
−RA
(
1 + 2kαRP + k
2α2RP (RA +RP )
)
2(1 + αk(RA +RP ))2
≤ 0, ∀α ∈ [αP , αP ].
Therefore, UP0 ≥ −e
RPR0e−RP
∫ T
0 H(α
P ,z⋆(αP ),0)ds. Indeed, z⋆(α̂s) is bounded so that the stochastic exponential
is trivially a true martingale. We now turn to the converse inequality, we have
UP0 ≤ sup
(Z,Γ)∈K
E
Pα
P
a⋆(Z·)
[
−E
(
−RP
∫ T
0
(αP )1/2(1− Zs)dW
a⋆(Z·)
s
)
eRP (R0−
∫ T
0 H(α
P ,Zs,Γs)ds)
]
.
According to Lemma 4.2(i), we obtain
UP0 ≤ −e
RPR0e−RPTH(α
P ,z⋆(αP ),0).
46
Hence, if αA ≤ αP ≤ αA, then UP0 = −e
RPR0e−RP
∫ T
0
H(αP ,z⋆(αP ),0)ds. We now prove that the contract
ξR0,z
⋆(αP ),0 ∈ CSB is indeed optimal. We have
inf
P∈P
a⋆(z⋆(αP ))
P
EP
[
−E
(
−RP
∫ T
0
α̂
1
2
s (1− z
⋆(αP ))dW a
⋆(z⋆(αP ))
s
)
eRP (R0−
∫ T
0
H(α̂s,z⋆(αP ),0)ds)
]
= UP0 ,
since by definition (4.23) of H, α 7−→ H(α, z⋆(αP ), 0) is decreasing, so that the above infimum is attained for
the measure Pα
P
a⋆(z⋆(αP ))
.
We now turn to the proof of (ii). Assume that αP ≤ αA ≤ αP . On the one hand
inf
P∈P
a⋆(z⋆(αA))
P
EP
[
−E
(
−RP
∫ T
0
α̂
1
2
s (1− z
⋆(αA))dW a
⋆(z⋆(αA))
s
)
eRP (R0−
∫ T
0 H(α̂s,z
⋆(αA),γ⋆)ds)
]
≤ UP0 ,
where γ⋆ := −RA(z
⋆(αA))2 −RP (1− z
⋆(αA))2. Thus, using Relation (4.24), we have
UP0 ≥ −e
RPR0e−RPTH(α
A,z⋆(αA),0).
On the other hand, since αA ∈ [αP , αP ]
UP0 ≤ e
RPR0 sup
(Z,Γ)∈U
E
Pα
A
a⋆(Z·)
[
−E
(
−RP
∫ T
0
αA
1/2
(1− Zs)dW
a⋆(Z·)
s
)
e−RP
∫ T
0
H(αA,Zs,Γs)ds
]
.
By using Lemma 4.2(i), we obtain
UP0 ≤ −e
RPR0e−RPTH(α
A,z⋆(αA),0).
We consider now a contract ξR0,z
⋆(αA),γ⋆ and we show that UP0 (ξ
R0,z⋆(αA),γ⋆) = UP0 . We have
inf
P∈P
a⋆(z⋆(αA)
P
EP
[
−E
(
−RP
∫ T
0
α̂1/2s (1− z
⋆(αA))dW a
⋆(z⋆(αA))
s
)
eRP (R0−
∫ T
0 H(α̂s,z
⋆(αA),γ⋆)ds)
]
= −eRPR0e−RPTH(α
A,z⋆(αA),0) = UP0 ,
since H(α, z⋆(αA), γ⋆) is actually independent of α.
The last two results are immediate consequences of Proposition 4.2.
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